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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the ways in which various constitutional
structures grant and constrain emergency powers. Specifically, the
Article examines how a country defines the emergency powers of its
chief executive and whether that definition is formal or informal.
The Article also explores what effect the distinction between formal
and informal powers has on a constitutional system’s ability to
prevent a devolution of constitutional norms.
The Article
undertakes this inquiry by examining the use of emergency powers
in different countries and at different times. It examines the
constitutions of Germany’s Weimar Republic, Charles de Gaulle’s
Fifth French Republic, and Indira Gandhi’s rule in India, as well as
specific examples from United States history. While there are
comparative aspects to this exploration, this is not a truly
comparative piece of scholarship. Rather, it is a series of case studies
aimed at identifying the advantages and disadvantages of the
United States’ constitutional treatment of emergency powers. The
Article also attempts to highlight recurring patterns, such as
legislative inaction, that lead to democratic devolution in
constitutional systems. This Article ultimately takes the position
that while an informal system of emergency powers, like that used
in the United States, provides the flexibility necessary for a
constitutional government to address legitimate emergencies
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without permanently stretching the separation of powers needed to
limit executive overreach, this system can only function if an
executive is sufficiently guided by informal constraints and
sanctions.
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INTRODUCTION

On April 16, 2017, Turkish voters went to the polls and approved
a referendum significantly changing their country’s constitution. 1
The main thrust of the amendment was to provide President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan sweeping new powers.2 Although he had acted as
the leader of the Government since 2014, President Erdogan had no
constitutional authority to do so.3 Rather, the Turkish Constitution
envisioned an “impartial [President] without full executive
authority.”4 One of these new powers included the sole authority to
declare states of emergency or to dismiss a sitting parliament.5 This
concentration of power in the hands of a president who had, over
the past eighteen months, fired or suspended over 130,000 people
and arrested another 45,000 in response to a failed coup attempt,6
made many observers nervous that Turkey would slip inevitably
into dictatorship.7
In February 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping moved to
consolidate power within the Communist party. 8 President Xi
successfully proposed eliminating presidential term limits, in effect
paving the way for “upending a model of collective leadership that
was put in place after the excesses of one-man rule” that plagued the
Chinese government after its inception.9 This action followed on the
1
Mark Lowen, Why Did Turkey Hold a Referendum?, BBC (Apr. 16, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38883556
[https://perma.cc/9L7L2LU8].
2 Id.
3
Patrick Kingsley, Erdogan Claims Vast Powers in Turkey After Narrow Victory
in
Referendum,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
16,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/world/europe/turkey-referendum-poll
s-erdogan.html [https://perma.cc/QD7A-KF9N].
4 Id.
5
Lowen, supra note 1.
6
Kingsley, supra note 3.
7
Lowen, supra note 1.
8
Salvatore Babones, Leader for Life: Xi Jinping Strengthens Hold on Power as
China Communist Party Ends Term Limits, FORBES (Feb. 25, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/salvatorebabones/2018/02/25/leader-for-life-xijinping-strengthens-hold-on-power-as-china-communist-party-ends-term-limits/
#3759c18ce466 [https://perma.cc/X4DN-QNUS].
9
Austin Ramzy, President Xi Jinping’s Rise in China, as Covered by The Times,
TIMES
(Feb.
26,
2018),
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-career-highlights
.html [https://perma.cc/F2NW-NCWL].
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heels of the Chinese party “enshrin[ing] ‘Xi Jinping Thought on
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in a New Era’ in the
constitution,” a move described in the press as “elevat[ing]
President Xi Jinping to the same status as . . . Mao Zedong and Deng
Xiaoping.”10
A year later, in February 2019, President Donald Trump declared
that a national emergency existed at the U.S.-Mexican border.11 He
then announced that he was using the authority granted to the
President by the National Emergency Act of 1976, 12 to order that
funds be allocated to build a wall along the border, to address the
declared emergency. 13 This announcement followed the longest
government shutdown in U.S. history, a shutdown precipitated in
no small part by Congress’ unwillingness to appropriate money for
a border wall.14 When congressional leaders and members of the
press questioned the legality of President Trump’s actions, he
announced that he believed he had the “absolute right” to declare a
National Emergency. 15 Journalists, pundits, commentators, and
scholars responded with varying degrees of criticism or support for
the President’s actions reigniting a debate on presidential
emergency powers that has surfaced repeatedly.16 Many questioned

10 Simon Denyer, China’s Leader Elevated to the Level Mao in Chinese Communist
Pantheon,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
24,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinas-leader-elevated-to-the-level-of
-mao-in-communist-pantheon/2017/10/24/ddd911e0-b832-11e7-9b93-b97043e57
a22_story.html [https://perma.cc/57XT-7VKR].
11
Jordan Fabian, Trump Declares National Emergency at Border, HILL (Feb. 15,
2019),
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/430092-trump-signsemergency-declaration-for-border [https://perma.cc/DZ8L-72EJ].
12
See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1601 et seq. (West 2016).
13
Damian Paletta, Mike DeBonis, & John Wagner, Trump Declares National
Emergency on Southern Border in Bid to Build Wall, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-border-emergency-the-presi
dent-plans-a-10-am-announcement-in-the-rose-garden/2019/02/15/f0310e62-311
0-11e9-86ab-5d02109aeb01_story.html [https://perma.cc/R38C-SSK5].
14 See id.
15
Catherine Lucey, Trump Says He Has ‘Absolute Right’ to Declare Emergency,
CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/cttrump-border-wall-emergency-20190219-story.html
[https://perma.cc/8V976EGR].
16 See, e.g., Elizabeth Goitein, The Alarming Scope of the President’s Emergency
(Jan/Feb
2019),
Powers,
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/presidential-emergen
cy-powers/576418/ [https://perma.cc/WPR9-JNL7].
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not only the existence of an actual emergency but also whether the
President himself truly believed that an emergency existed.17
Both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate,
employing procedures from the National Emergency Act, voted to
block the President’s emergency declaration. 18 This was the first
time in the Act’s history that Congress had attempted such action.19
And while the resolution attracted some support from Republican
legislators, it did not command the two thirds support necessary to
override President Trump’s veto and the declaration remained in
place.20
The Trump Administration’s decision to invoke the statutory
powers granted to the President by Congress, for a purpose
specifically rejected by Congress, sparked significant debate and
commentary. This Article, however, proposes a broader look at the
use of executive emergency powers beyond those canonized by
statute. This Article examines the ways in which a country’s
constitutional structure may grant or deny emergency powers to its
Executive and what methods of shaping emergency powers have
been more successful. Specifically, this Article looks at the
distinction between “formal” and “informal” grants of emergency
power.
The idea of the archetypical strong man as a necessity to
successfully navigate troubled times in a nation’s life span has a long
history. From tribal leaders, to kings, to dictators, the rule of one has
been a recurring theme in human government. The question this
17 See, e.g., Peter Baker, Trump Declares a National Emergency, and Provokes a
TIMES
(Feb.
15,
2019),
Constitutional
Clash,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/national-emergency-trump.
html [https://perma.cc/7JTF-LQU5]. Critics argued that President Trump “may
have undercut his own argument that the border situation was so urgent that it
required emergency action. ‘I didn’t need to do this, but I’d rather do it much
faster,’ he said. ‘I just want to get it done faster, that’s all.’” Id.
18
Jacob Pramuk, Trump Tweets ‘VETO!’ After Senate Votes to Block His Border
Emergency
Declaration,
CNBC
(Mar.
14,
2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/14/senate-votes-to-block-trump-border-wall-n
ational-emergency-declaration.html [https://perma.cc/7WQR-Q7D4].
19
Sarah Binder, The Senate Voted to Block Trump’s National Emergency
POST
(March
15,
2019),
Declaration.
Now
What?,
WASH
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/15/senate-voted-block-tru
mps-national-emergency-declaration-now-what/ [https://perma.cc/6JTB-FP86].
20
Michael Tackett, Trump Issues First Veto After Congress Rejects Border
TIMES
(Mar.
15,
2019),
Emergency,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/us/politics/trump-veto-national-emerg
ency.html [https://perma.cc/7ERF-7JQQ].

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss2/1

2020]

Executives in Crisis

347

Article seeks to explore is what happens when a government
designed to prevent the rise of a strongman, such as a constitutional
democracy or republic, faces the type of external or internal crises
that seem tailor-made for the strong hand of a dictator? How have
other constitutional governments handled such situations and what
type of constitutional system has been most successful in both
navigating crises and restraining the rise of a dictator? Is a
constitutional system which explicitly allows for the suspension of
constitutional restraints in the face of an emergency better able to
cope with crisis than one that makes no such exceptions? And,
alternatively, which system rebounds to a proper constitutional
order more effectively when the crisis has passed? This Article
attempts to explore these questions by looking at the actual
experiences of four separate constitutional governments in crisis:
Weimar Germany, 21 France’s Fifth Republic, 22 Indira Gandhi’s
India, 23 and the United States during the Civil War, 24 the Great
Depression, World War II,25 and the War on Terror.26
Before beginning the analysis, it is important to note what this
paper is not. It is not a comparative constitutional study, in the true
sense of those words. I am not and do not pretend to be a
comparativist. Much of the documentation I have relied upon for
non-English sources are translations, which means that any nuanced
analysis of language is hindered by those translations. Nor does this
Article seek to recommend a “best” solution for the constitutional
questions explored. Rather, it seeks to explore the strengths and
weaknesses that have emerged in different constitutional designs
when various countries have undergone extremely volatile
situations.
Instead of being a truly comparative analysis, this Article is
primarily aimed at examining why the United States has not, over
its two-hundred-and-forty-year history, devolved into a true
dictatorship and what effect the lack of a formal, emergency power
“safety valve” has had on the role of the U.S. President over time.
Accordingly, the countries examined in this Article were not chosen
because they are representative of different styles of constitutional
21
22
23
24
25
26

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Section VI.a.
See infra Section VI.b.
See infra Section VI.c.
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systems. Rather, the examples of Weimar Germany, the French Fifth
Republic, and Indira Gandhi’s India were chosen because the
constitutions in place at the time each of these countries faced
significant national emergencies included explicit emergency
powers provisions and, in each one, the use of those emergency
powers allowed a dictatorial regime to come to power, at least
temporarily. This Article will contrast these experiences with those
of the United States (whose Constitution lacks any explicit
emergency powers clause) and evaluate whether the United States
would have been better off had its constitution allowed for the
temporary suspension of constitutional constraints.
It is also important to note that this Article does not claim that
the existence of explicit constitutional emergency powers always
leads to “executive domination” or that such a constitutional
provision is the only reason why such “constitutional dictatorships”
emerged in the countries analyzed. 27 Rather, it focuses on the
narrow question of whether explicit or implicit emergency power
regimes provide a better check against tyranny. Ultimately, this
Article contends that while both systems can be manipulated to
expand executive power, an implicit model such as the U.S.
Constitution has proven to be less susceptible to being used to
extend an individual’s hold on power. This conclusion comes with
a significant caveat: because an implied system of emergency
powers makes no formal distinction between the powers that can be
exercised within and without the confines of any particular
emergency, many of the restrictions in place in an implied system
rely on a respect for informal methods of checking institutional
power.
Part II briefly surveys the literature surrounding constitutional
dictatorship. This will help provide context for the country-specific
analysis to follow. Parts III-V will examine the use of emergency
powers in Weimar Germany, the French Fifth Republic, and Indira
Gandhi’s India, as well as provide some context regarding the crisis
situations which allowed these governments to justify the use of
emergency powers. These Parts will also look at the aftermath of
27 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 605, 616 (2003) (“Many constitutions contain explicit provisions for
emergency powers, either in text or in judicial doctrine. Sometimes executive
domination has overtaken the relevant polities, sometimes it has not; other
variables probably dominate, such as the nation’s stage of development, or its
susceptibility to economic shocks, or the design of legislative and judicial
institutions.” (footnote omitted)).
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emergency power use, primarily focusing on the ways in which
executive power was affected. Part VI will recount the ways in
which the U.S. President used the executive power when faced with
substantial crises, focusing on Abraham Lincoln during the Civil
War, Franklin Delano Roosevelt during the Great Depression and
World War II, and George W. Bush during the War on Terror. Part
VII will argue that including an emergency powers provision in a
constitution invites executive overreach—especially as a means to
maintain political powers—and is unnecessary to enable a
constitutional democracy to respond to national crises. It will also
analyze the resulting effects on executive power and explore
whether informal expansions of power have a greater lasting effect
than formal suspensions of constitutional protections. The Article
then briefly concludes.
II. EMERGENCY POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: A
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
The question of whether a constitutional democracy can survive
a crisis without sacrificing the ideals enshrined in its constitution has
plagued constitutional drafters and theorists alike. 28 In the
immediate aftermath of World War II scholars such as Clinton
Rossiter questioned the very possibility that a constitutional
democracy could survive without a properly structured emergency
system, which he termed a “constitutional dictatorship.” 29 While
various arguments emerged in the subsequent three quarters of a
century, the core component of this inquiry still remains an
important topic among constitutional designers and scholars.
But what is the import of all this theoretical discussion? Why
has it so fascinated scholars of constitutional design and
comparative constitutionalism alike? What is the significance of this
dilemma? The question is really one of the legality of emergency
28
See, e.g., Benjamin A. Kleinerman, “In the Name of National Security”:
Executive Discretion and Congressional Legislation in the Civil War and World War II, in
THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 91, 92 (Jeffrey K. Tulis & Stephen
Macedo eds., 2010) (“[H]ow best does a constitutional republic respond to threats
to its existence? Should it legalize those new powers that have now become
necessary? Or should it merely exercise these powers outside the legal order during
the seemingly temporary and extraordinary security threat?”).
29
CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN
THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1948).
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action: Can a constitution adapt or “stretch” to fit the needs
necessary for its own survival? Or must it be altered to avoid losing
legitimacy? And if it can stretch, what mechanisms must be in place
to shrink executive powers back to their proper place? Or, if it must
be changed, how can a constitution that needs to be altered to
survive an emergency avoid alteration that defeats the entire
constitutional purpose?
As might be imagined, these questions have been tackled in
countless ways by countless scholars with countless different views.
This Article does not attempt to provide a definitive answer to these
questions, nor is it intended to add yet another voice to this
voluminous discussion. Rather, it will look at a selection of realworld experiences with various forms of constitutional emergency
powers and attempt to draw a few modest conclusions about our
own constitutional mechanisms for responding to external and
internal emergencies. While this Article is not, primarily, a
theoretical discussion, it is necessary to frame the theoretical
landscape in order to make the most of the historical examples that
follow.
First, we must define what we mean by “emergency powers.”
For purposes of this Article emergency powers are the tools that are
available to a constitutional government when faced with varying
crises. These may be expressly allowed by constitutional provisions
designed to be triggered only in the case of an emergency,30 or they
may be implied by vague or ambiguous language designed to be in
effect at all times.31 Examples of the “explicit” brand of emergency
powers that will be discussed in this Article are the state of
emergency provided for in Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution,32
the “state of siege” in France’s Fifth Republic,33 and the emergency
powers provision in the Indian Constitution. 34
“Implicit”
emergency power is exemplified by the ways in which the U.S.

30
31
32
33
34

See infra Parts III-VI.
See infra Section VII.c.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
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President has used his “Commander-in-Chief” powers 35 and the
equally ill-defined “executive power” vested by Article II.36
While both types of emergency powers have proven effective in
the face of nation-threatening emergencies, they also each present
their own unique dangers. While explicit emergency powers are
typically accompanied by constitutionalized protective measures, if
those measures fail, explicit powers allow for the suspension of
constitutional protections which can allow the executive to exercise
essentially dictatorial powers. Implicit constitutional powers, by
contrast, must remain within the constitutional structure. The ways
in which executive power can be stretched, however, may not be
clearly defined which may in turn lead to a gradual expansion of
executive powers as each crisis expands the executive without an
equal and opposite rebound effect at the end of the crisis. The
remainder of this Part will lay out some of the key points that mark
the boundaries of the scholarly debate on implicit versus explicit
emergency powers before the Article turns its attention to a more
focused look at the experiences of individual countries.
a. Theoretical Frameworks
Professor Jules Lobel has provided a useful, if perhaps overlysimplified, breakdown of the views regarding constitutional
emergency powers, dividing the arguments into three main
frameworks: Absolutist, Relativist, and Liberalist.37 According to
Professor Lobel, absolutists argue that there are no emergency
powers outside a country’s written constitution, and they point to
existing constitutional provisions as evidence that no others are
available.38 This position essentially boils down to the idea that the
powers granted in the Constitution are sufficient to protect the
nation even in emergencies; but if they turn out to be inadequate,
suspending protections of individual rights is not worth the cost to

35
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual service of the United States . . . .”).
36
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.”).
37
Jules Lobel, Comment, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE
L.J. 1385, 1386-92 (1989).
38 Id. at 1386-87.
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constitutional government.39 This view of constitutional powers is
dangerously close to the “suicide pact” critiqued by Professor
Michael Stokes Paulsen,40 and would threaten the survival of nearly
any constitutional democracy. While this view has some support in
the legal academy, it is not widely accepted by judicial or executive
actors.
By contrast, relativists “argue[] that the Constitution is a flexible
document that permits the President to take whatever measures are
necessary in crisis situations.”41 This relativist position seems to be
the one that has been most widely accepted by U.S. Presidents.
Lincoln’s defense of his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus that
it was necessary that “all the laws but one” should be enforced to
ensure the survival of the country aligns with the relativist
position. 42 Similarly Professor Lobel highlights that “President
Franklin Roosevelt articulated the [relativist] view that the President
has the constitutional power to ignore statutory provisions when
‘necessary to avert a disaster which would interfere with the
winning of the war.’”43
Scholarly support for the relativist position can go too far,
sometimes appearing to contend that any executive action to combat
a national emergency is constitutional provided that it does not
provoke a response from the other branches of government.
Professor Paulsen, for example, seems to take this approach by
locating implied emergency powers within the Presidential oath to
“preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United

Id. at 1387.
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1257, 1258-59 (2004) (“The alternative [to locating implicit emergency powers in the
U.S. Constitution] is near-absurdity: that the parts should be construed, and given
effect, even at the expense of preservation of the Constitution as a whole, with the
logical consequence that adherence to the Constitution might require destruction
of the Constitution.”).
41
Lobel, supra note 37, at 1388.
42
Abraham Lincoln, Address to Congress (July 4th, 1861); see also Letter from
Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, to Albert G. Hodges, U.S. Senator
(April 4, 1864) in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, at 585 (Don
E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (“I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might
become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the constitution,
through the preservation of the nation.”). For a more complete discussion of
Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus see infra Section VI.a.
43
Lobel, supra note 37, at 1388 (quoting E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND
POWERS 250-51 (4th ed. 1957) (quoting Roosevelt’s Speech to Congress, September
7, 1942)).
39
40
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States.”44 Professor Paulsen’s argument that this broad reading of
the Presidential Oath was its original understanding proves too
much. First, this focus on the power granted by the oath overlooks
the obligation imposed by it. One could just as easily argue that the
Constitution, which the President must preserve, protect, and
defend, requires the President to preserve it “intact.” In other
words, if the Constitution must be violated to the extent that it no
longer protects its own inherent central tenants and ideals to
“preserve” the Union, the oath has already been violated.
Moreover, Professor Paulsen places the obligation to control
executive power on the other branches of government, writing:
Both the judiciary, through the power of constitutional
interpretation it possesses in deciding cases arising under the
Constitution, and the Congress, through the power of
constitutional interpretation it possesses in exercising its
legislative powers and the check of impeachment, have a
duty of independent constitutional review over the
judgment of necessity.45
This position, however, ignores important separation of powers
principles. By arguing that the President can exercise whatever
power he wants until the other branches step in, Professor Paulsen
is implicitly arguing that either the executive can exercise powers
which it does not constitutionally possess, or that the judicial and
legislative branches can, by taking affirmative actions, restrict the
use of constitutionally permissible executive power. The logical end
of this argument is that there is no limit placed on the executive by
the Constitution and the outer extent of the executive power is
simply as much as he can get away with before Congress and the
Courts step in.
Finally, Professor Paulsen perhaps overlooks the Framers’
understanding that they were engaging in a “first-of-its-kind”
experiment. In the context of a “national experiment,” it might be
acceptable for the experiment to fail if it could not protect the
Lockean ideals on which the country was founded. While this does
not mean that a reasonable mind could not find the language of the
oath broad enough to support the meaning urged by Professor
44
Paulsen, supra note 40, at 1258 (“In short, the Constitution either creates or
recognizes a constitutional law of necessity, and appears to charge the President with
the primary duty of applying it and judging the degree of necessity in the press of
circumstances.”).
45 Id. at 1259.
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Paulsen, it does undermine his claim that the Framers intended the
oath to carry such significance.
Professor Lobel’s third and final classification attempts to split
the difference between the absolutists and the relativists. His
liberalists (which refers to the traditional idea of “liberal
constitutionalism”) recognize a distinction between “normal” and
“crisis” times for purposes of government. 46 Under the liberalist
model, a constitution does not contain the elasticity championed by
the relativist framework. 47 Those exercising executive authority,
however, may act outside of the constitutional framework if an
emergency situation necessitates such action.48 A key component of
the liberalist framework is that the executive must acknowledge that
it is acting without legal or constitutional authority. 49 In such
situations, officials could be sued in court for their actions and held
liable even if the actions were deemed necessary. The legislature
could then indemnify the official for such actions if it believed that
the official had acted properly, even though unconstitutionally. 50
Professor Lobel argues that this was the initial view of emergency
powers held by the Framers.51
An important distinction between the liberalist and relativist
models is that while the extent of “allowable” executive action may
be similar in both frameworks, the liberalist model would recognize
that action as illegal or unconstitutional and would hold the
executive liable, while the relativist would deem such actions to be
fully legal and constitutional provided they were necessary to
confront the emergency. An in-depth inquiry into which of these
models may be “best” for an implied emergency powers regime is
beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, this overview attempts to
merely delineate the theoretical battlegrounds and provide the
reader with a digestible way of approaching some of the important
questions that are raised in the literature and discussed below.
Lobel, supra note 37, at 1388.
Id. at 1388-89.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1389-90 (“Courts could impose personal liability on those executive
officials who undertook unconstitutional actions, even when such officials acted
pursuant to good faith motivations to defuse a crisis. Subsequent to a court's
declaration of the unlawfulness of an exercise of emergency power, however,
Congress could decide to indemnify the official if it believed the official's actions
really were justified by extreme necessity.”).
50 Id. at 1390.
51 Id.
46
47

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss2/1

2020]

Executives in Crisis

355

b. Key Questions: Ratcheting, Toggling, and Legality
Considering the basic framework outlined in the preceding
Section, this Section will examine a few of the key questions that
continue to predominate the academic discussion. The first point of
contention in this debate that is essential to this Article’s analysis is
whether executive power under an implicit emergency powers
system experiences a “ratcheting effect.” 52 That is, whether each
expansion of executive power in the face of a national crisis results
in a permanent expansion of the role of the executive. Or does
executive power ebb and flow in parallel with the crisis? Future
Judge Scott Matheson described this idea in his 2009 book as a
repeating pattern, writing that: “The pattern in a crisis often is
executive action, legislative acquiescence, and judicial tolerance that
reflects the institutional characteristics of the branches.”53
Professor Kim Lane Scheppele, focuses on this question of
elasticity in an implied emergency powers system like the United
States and argues that such a system allows the executive to
gradually move the “baseline” of executive power.54 She bases this
argument on a theory of “small emergencies”55 and posits that the
United States has been operating under an emergency government
since the end of World War I.56 The danger in this type of emergency
power structure is that with each “small” emergency, executive
power is expanded and the end of a small emergency does not result
in a concomitant reduction in the scope of executive power. This

52
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 609 (“The institutional argument is
that emergencies work like a ratchet: With every emergency, constitutional
protections are reduced, and after the emergency is over, enhancement of
constitutional powers is either maintained or not fully eliminated, so that the
executive ends up with more power after the emergency than it had before the
emergency. With each successive emergency, the executive’s power is ratcheted
up.”); see also id. at 610.
53
SCOTT M. MATHESON, JR., PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM IN PERILOUS
TIMES 14 (2009).
54
Kim Lane Scheppele, Small Emergencies, 40 GA. L. REV. 835, 840 (2006).
55
Id. at 835 (defining “small emergencies” as “problems that are deemed
worthy of exceptional solutions, but are simultaneously deemed too minor to
warrant a full-fledged reassessment of constitutional structures and constitutional
aspirations”).
56 Id. at 836 (“America is now—and has been since the First World War—
virtually always in a state of emergency, one way or another.”).
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expanded power is then “absorbed and rationalized” by an implied
emergency power system.57
In contrast to Professor Scheppele, Professors Eric Posner and
Adrian Vermeule have argued that the notion of the executive
power ratchet is simply not true because “institutional change
displays no consistent trend or mechanism and is determined
differently in different contexts by a complex mix of political,
economic, and technological forces.” 58 In rejecting the idea of an
executive powers “ratchet,” Vermeule and Posner find individual
expansions of executive power to be less problematic. Rather than
a one-way ratcheting up of executive power, they describe
emergency executive action as having a spillover effect. 59 This
spillover effect may change the balance of power between the
executive and the other branches, but it may be cleaned up if the
other branches resist this acquisition of executive power.60
Alternatively, Posner and Vermeule posit that even if the
spillover effect turns into a more or less permanent increase in
executive power, that increase would be “in itself, neither good nor
bad.”61 Rather, they assert that “[t]he only question is whether the
new state of affairs is an improvement on the status quo ante or not;
if it is an improvement, then the spillover was a benign event.”62
This “no harm no foul” approach to shifts in the balance of
governmental power, however, ignores a serious potential for
abuse. It does not take into account the fact that, while the “new
state of affairs” created by a spillover may appropriately reconfigure
the security-liberty balance, this rebalancing often occurs in an
informal way that may not be recognizable at the time. This
informal barrier may be exploited in the future if an executive who
is willing to break through informal barriers gains control of these
increases in executive discretion.
In addition to the question of whether increases in executive
power “ratchet” up in an inexorable expansion, another key
question regarding emergency power is whether it is or should be
legal. Professor Benjamin Kleinerman argues that we should

57
58
59
60
61
62

Id. at 837.
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 619.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 622.
Id.
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distinguish between a “legal order” and a “constitutional order.”63
In other words, though an action may in fact be extralegal, that does
not necessarily mean that the action is unconstitutional. Professor
Kleinerman’s theory arises from the dangers he sees in requiring
that every action taken by a constitutional government must be
sanctioned by law. 64 This focus on the legality of the action,
according to Professor Kleinerman, requires that a constitutional
government must be given the authority to adjust its own laws when
faced with an emergency to which the current legal structure cannot
respond.65 This will result in a constitutional paradox of sorts: “The
difficulty is that, precisely by creating the legal authority to exercise
extraordinary powers, one runs the risk that they will become both
routinized and institutionalized.” 66 Rather, Professor Kleinerman
would read into a constitution the inherent ability to respond to
crises regardless of the “legality” of the means exercised.
The difficulty with Professor Kleinerman’s model is that he
undervalues the role that executive precedent plays in the expansion
of executive power. Kleinerman writes: “I would say that the
temporary, extralegal, nonprecedential, and explicitly impeachable
quality of executive discretion prevents it from creating [a]
dangerous principle . . . while the legal, precedential, and
representative character of legislative action does create such a
principle.” 67 Experience, however, would indicate that executive
precedent actually plays a significant role in defining the limits of
presidential authority. This role of executive precedent will be
examined below, particularly in the contexts of Weimar Germany
and the U.S. system.68
Professor Scheppele provides a different approach to this
position as well and argues that it is this exact lack of a “toggle”
between emergency and non-emergency action that has led to what
she describes as a continuous expansion of executive power. She
describes the problem as follows:
America has not in general had a toggle-switch approach to
crises, where normal constitutionalism continues until a
switch is flipped to stop it, and then the emergency continues
63
64
65
66
67
68

Kleinerman, supra note 28, at 92-93.
Id. at 92.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 102-03.
See infra Parts III, VI.
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until the switch is flipped back. Instead, the United States
has tended to normalize its emergencies. As a result, normal
governance is at least in part always emergency governance,
even when a crisis is not looming.69
In essence, Professor Scheppele argues that by trying to legitimize
emergency powers as a proper exercise of constitutional authority,
there is no mechanism in place to “take back” the expanded powers
exercised by the executive during an emergency. Rather, the
government should acknowledge the extra-constitutional nature of
its actions. This position will remind readers of the “liberalist” camp
outlined above. Once again, a definitive answer to these questions
is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is important for the reader
to keep these questions in mind when evaluating the strengths and
weaknesses of the emergency power regimes discussed in the
following Parts.
III. EMERGENCY POWERS IN WEIMAR GERMANY
The Weimar Republic is the prime example of the dangers of
constitutional emergency powers and is a favorite punching bag of
those who argue that a constitution that allows for emergency
powers outside the traditional constitutional process is a
constitution which invites its own usurpation. Indeed, the fact that
the collapse of the Weimar Republic allowed Hitler and the Nazi
Party to seize control of the German government seems to provide
all the evidence necessary to show that emergency powers are too
dangerous to be allowed. The Weimar Republic has also served as
a cautionary tale for advocates of constitutional emergency powers,
a bright warning sign showing the necessity of providing proper
checks and restrictions on an otherwise desirable tool of
constitutional governance.70 Neither opponents nor proponents of
emergency powers can avoid discussing the stark example of the
Weimar Republic and the role that emergency powers played in the
collapse of the fragile interbellum constitutional structure.
The Weimar Constitution was drafted by members of the
National Constituent Assembly.
The National Constituent
Scheppele, supra note 54, at 839.
See, e.g., FREDERICK MUNDELL WATKINS, THE FAILURE
EMERGENCY POWERS UNDER THE GERMAN REPUBLIC 16 (1939).
69
70
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Assembly was elected on January 19, 191971 and promulgated the
Constitution on August 14, 1919. 72 A full discussion of this
constitutional drafting process is well beyond the scope of this
Article, but there are a few important concepts to note. First, it
seems clear that the Weimar Constitution was, from the outset, a
compromised document. The left wing Social Democratic Party
wanted far greater protections for workers than they received; and
right-wing aristocrats wanted to restore the monarchy and resented
the idea of constitutional government at all.73
To assuage the fear of “parliamentary absolutism” held by those
on the right, a Reich President was created by the Constitution and
endowed with “extensive powers”74 including the ability to declare
a state of Emergency “[i]f the public safety and order” were
“seriously disturbed or endangered.”75 The powers granted by a
state of emergency were outlined in Article 48 of the Weimar
Constitution, 76 and allowed the President to take the measures

71 See DETLEV J. K. PEUKERT, THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC: THE CRISIS OF CLASSICAL
MODERNITY 4 (Richard Deveson trans., 1989).
72 Id.
73
EBERHARD KOLB, THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC 19 (P.S. Falla & R. J. Park trans., 2d
ed. 2005).
74
Id.
75
ROSSITER, supra note 29, at 31 (translating Article 48 of the Weimar
Constitution).
76
The full text of Article 48, as translated by Clinton Rossiter in his book
Constitutional Dictatorship, reads,

If a state does not fulfill the duties incumbent upon it under the
national Constitution or laws, the President of the Reich may compel it to
do so with the aid of the armed forces.
If the public safety and order in the German Reich are seriously
disturbed or endangered, the President of the Reich may take the
measures necessary to the restoration of the public safety and order, and
may intervene with the armed forces. To this end he may temporarily
suspend in whole or in part the fundamental rights established in Articles
114 (inviolability of person), 115 (inviolability of domicile), 117 (secrecy of
communication), 118 (freedom of opinion and expression thereof), 123
(freedom of assembly), 124 (freedom of association), and 153 (inviolability
of property).
The President of the Reich must immediately inform the Reichstag of
all measures taken in conformity with section 1 or 2 of this Article.
The measures are to be revoked upon the demand of the Reichstag.
In cases where delay would be dangerous, the state government may
take for its territory temporary measures of the nature described in section

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2021

360

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:2

“necessary to the restoration of the public safety and order.”77 This
included the ability to suspend certain constitutional protections
such as freedom of the press, freedom of association, and
inviolability of persons and property, as well as the power to use the
armed forces “if necessary” to restore order and to create special
military courts.78
The checks which the Weimar constitution placed on the use of
emergency powers proved to be startlingly inadequate. First, the
language of Article 48 was vague and failed to provide much in the
way of guidance in determining when a state of emergency existed
and what powers the government could exercise during an
emergency. For example, Article 48 authorized emergency action
whenever “public safety and order in the German Reich is materially
disturbed or endangered.”79 What constituted a material disturbance
was not defined anywhere else in the document. Additionally,
2. The measures are to be revoked upon the demand of the President of
the Reich or the Reichstag.
A national law shall prescribe the details.
ROSSITER, supra note 29, at 31 (translating Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution).
Another helpful translation is reprinted in Frederick M. Watkins’ The Failure of
Constitutional Emergency Powers under the German Republic. It reads,
If any state fails to perform the duties imposed upon it by the federal
constitution or by federal laws, the president may hold it to the
performance thereof with the aid of the armed forces.
If public safety and order in the German Reich is materially disturbed
or endangered, the president may take necessary measures to restore
public safety and order, intervening if necessary with the aid of the armed
forces. To this end he may temporarily suspend, in whole or in part, the
fundamental rights established by Articles 114 [personal liberty], 115
[inviolability of dwelling places], 117 [secrecy of postal, telegraphic and
telephonic communications], 118 [freedom in the expression of opinion],
123 [freedom of assembly], 124 [freedom of association] and 153 [private
property].
The president must immediately inform the Reichstag of all measures
adopted by authority of the first or second paragraphs of this Article.
These measures are to be revoked upon demand of the Reichstag.
In cases where delay would be dangerous the cabinet of a state
government may for its own territory take provisional measures as
specified in paragraph 2. These measures are to be revoked on demand of
the president or of the Reichstag.
Further details will be regulated by federal law.
WATKINS, supra note 70, at 15 (translating Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution).
77
ROSSITER, supra note 29, at 31.
78
WATKINS, supra note 70, at 15, 32.
79
Id. (emphasis added).
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Article 48 authorized the use of all necessary measures to restore
order and public safety. 80 As the contemporary political science
scholar Frederick Watkins noted in 1939, this was a remarkable
grant of power to the government with little in place to limit its
scope.81
Second, in addition to the use of vague language to grant
exceptionally broad powers to the government acting in an
emergency, Article 48 also limited the role of the Reichstag to that of
a negative veto on emergency actions, requiring only that “[t]he
president must immediately inform the Reichstag of all measures
adopted by . . . this Article. These measures are to be revoked upon
demand of the Reichstag.”82 By removing Parliamentary assent as a
requirement for the effective exercise of emergency authority,
Article 48 provided an easy way for the legislature to avoid making
difficult decisions during crisis situations. Rather, the Reichstag
could play a passive role allowing the executive to carry out the
unpopular measures necessary to resolve a crisis. While this may
have been politically convenient for the legislature, it allowed for
legislative abdication during an emergency, which effectively
removed the legislature as a check on emergency action.
Finally, Article 48 provided no specific role for the judiciary to
serve as a check upon emergency government action. While the
judiciary could review specific actions taken by the government
during a state of emergency to see if that action was within the
powers granted by Article 48, this rarely proved to be a significant
check upon the executive. 83 The language of Article 48 was
remarkably vague, giving little guidance which the courts could rely
on to interpret the outer limits of the powers granted therein. But,
perhaps more importantly, even though the courts could
occasionally review a specific action taken under the Article 48
powers, the executive was given sole discretion to decide when
circumstances sufficiently justified a declaration of emergency. 84
Id.
Id.
82
Id.
83
But see id. at 104-05 (citing an important counterexample to this general
judicial passivity in the supreme court’s ruling that “the appointment of state
representatives by a federal commissioner was a wholly illegal act”).
84
See id. at 21 (“Since the custom of the German judiciary had always been to
accept findings of the government in matters of fact, the courts were consistent
throughout the lifetime of the Republic in their refusal to inquire into the actual
necessity of any measures taken on the basis of Article 48.”).
80
81
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Therefore, the courts played almost no role in checking the ability of
the government to invoke the powers of Article 48, even though they
may have limited the use of those powers at the margins.
Historians of the Weimar period (including Professor Watkins)
have focused on the use of emergency powers in three semi-distinct
periods: First, in response to coup attempts in the immediate
aftermath of World War II; second, to deal with the deflationary
crisis of 1922-1923 that was triggered by Germany’s inability to meet
the harsh reparation requirements imposed by the Treaty of
Versailles; and third, in an effort to combat the devastating effects of
the worldwide depression which began in 1929. Scholars are split
on the effectiveness of Article 48 to combat crises in the early years
of the Weimar Republic, but there is consensus that by the time
Article 48 was used to prop up failing government after failing
government during the Depression, emergency powers had become
the source of constitutional collapse.
a. Article 48 and Armed Uprisings
The emergency powers granted by Article 48 were used almost
immediately after the creation of the Weimar Republic. Socialist and
Communist uprisings were not a regular occurrence, but they were
not all that infrequent either. 85 Reactionary putsch attempts from
disaffected right-wing members of the recently disbanded military
were also a constant threat. 86 The Reich government was
responsible for ensuring the continued viability of the Weimar
Republic in the face of these anti-constitutional actions.
One limitation on the effectiveness of the emergency powers
granted by Article 48 was revealed by the drastically different ways
the emergency-empowered government acted in response to both
right- and left-wing-led civil unrest. Because the tools provided by
Article 48 to respond to armed insurrection primarily incorporated
a military response, Article 48 measures were only available if the
military could be counted on to support the federal government.87
Because the upper echelons of the German military were largely
populated with right-leaning supporters of the pre-war Imperial
85 See id. at 25-26 (discussing the Communist insurrection of 1920 and the peak
influence of Marxist revolutionaries in Germany immediately following WWI).
86
See ROSSITER, supra note 29, at 40
87
See id. at 40-41.
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government, the Reich could rarely invoke the powers of Article 48
to confront reactionary violence. For example, a right-wing putsch
attempt in Berlin began on March 13, 1920.88 The government was
unable to respond because the military presence in Berlin was
sympathetic to the coup attempt. 89 Fortunately for the young
republic, the putsch was not well organized, was opposed by the
Unions in the city, and quickly collapsed even without federal
intervention.90
Perhaps the most (in)famous example of federal impotence in
the face of right-wing extremism was the tepid federal response to
Adolf Hitler’s Beer Hall putsch in Munich in 1923. Briefly, this coup
attempt commenced on November 8, 1923, when Adolf Hitler
extracted at gunpoint various National Socialist concessions from
the local government.91 The actual armed threat was put down the
following day, but notably it was the Bavarian state government that
effectively dealt with the crisis and not the Reich government itself.92
German historian and political scientist Eberhard Kolb described the
events with significant understatement noting that the Reich
government had “acted much less energetically against right-wing
insurgence in Bavaria in November 1923 than they had done against
left-wing Saxony and Thuringia in the previous month.”93
In contrast to the relative ineffectiveness of the Article 48 powers
to confront reactionary uprisings, the Reich government made
extensive use of its Article 48 powers to suppress Socialist uprisings
during the early 1920s. Unlike during the Berlin putsch attempt, for
example, the Reich government relied extensively on its Article 48
powers to put down a threatened Communist Insurrection in the
early spring of 1920. 94 Because the military was staunchly antiCommunist, the question of divided loyalties, which restrained
federal use of emergency powers during right-wing insurrections,
posed no similar obstacle to crushing left-wing unrest. Threatened
strikes in January of 1920 and 1921 were quickly and harshly

88
89
90
91
92
93
94

KOLB, supra note 73, at 37-38.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id. at 50.
Id.; WATKINS, supra note 70, at 38.
KOLB, supra note 73, at 50.
WATKINS, supra note 70, at 28-30.
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suppressed by military forces authorized to take action under
Article 48.95
Then, in the Fall of 1923, the government learned that
preparations for an armed Communist uprising in Saxony and
Thuringia (both left-leaning German states) were well underway.96
The Reich government took immediate and extensive emergency
actions. Professor Kolb described the events as follows:
[A]s the political crisis became acute, the government had
proclaimed a state of emergency throughout Germany,
whereby executive power was transferred to regional
military commanders as representatives of the Ministry of
Defence. When the Saxon Prime Minister, Erich Zeigner
(SPD) [Socialist Party], refused to carry out the orders of the
regional commander and disband the proletarian defence
units, the central government sent Reichswehr troops into
Saxony on 23 October and, a few days later, categorically
ordered Zeigner to drop the communists from his Cabinet.97
The federally appointed commissioner then instituted military
tribunals to hear cases brought against those accused of aiding the
insurrection and acted swiftly to censor publications that were
sympathetic to the Communist parties.98 Once order was restored,
the military control of these provinces was lifted. But these
experiences demonstrated the significant amount of control the
government could exert over individual liberties using only the
authority of Article 48. This authority would soon be expanded
even further when the Republic faced a new kind of emergency in
1923.
b. Article 48 and Emergency Legislation
A significant shift in the use of Article 48 occurred during the
deflationary crisis of 1923. After France invaded the Ruhr Valley,
Germany declared a massive general strike and attempted to
subsidize its work force. 99 As the strike wore on, however, and
95
96
97
98
99

KOLB, supra note 73, at 36, 45-46.
Id. at 49.
Id.
WATKINS, supra note 70, at 31-34.
Id. at 74.
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France remained in occupied territory, the German economy
reached the verge of collapse with inflation making its currency
essentially worthless.100 Between December 1922 and August 1923,
the German Mark went from an already appallingly unhealthy 8,000
to 1 ratio against the dollar to an essentially valueless 1 million to 1
ratio.101 In order to combat this economic crisis, significant federal
action was needed. The governing coalition in the Reichstag,
however, was made up of such a wide variety of pro-constitutional
groups that the diversity of opinion on how to handle the crisis
made concerted action impossible.102 While Article 48 had initially
been used primarily to deploy the federal army in response to armed
uprisings (a traditional use of emergency powers), the Stresemann
government claimed for the first time that Article 48 gave it the
authority to issue emergency legislation and issued “a round dozen
or so of decrees” to combat the economic crisis.103
It is important to note, however, that the Cabinet did not feel
comfortable relying solely on Article 48 for the issuance of
emergency decrees and soon sought additional authorization from
the Reichstag in the form of an enabling act which explicitly
authorized such actions. 104 The enabling act specifically tied its
longevity to the stability of the Stresemann government and when
the Social Democrats pulled out of the Cabinet on Nov. 2, 1923 in
Id.
KOLB, supra note 73, at 48.
102
WATKINS, supra note 70, at 75.
103 Id. at 75.
104 Ermächtigungsgesetz [Enabling Act], Oct. 15, 1923, RGBL I at 943, §§ 1, 2
(Ger.), translated in WATKINS, supra note 70, at 76. The full text of the enabling act
reads:
100
101

The federal government is authorized to take those measures which
it considers to be absolutely necessary in the financial, economic and social
realms. Fundamental rights guaranteed in the Weimar Constitution may
be disregarded in the process.
This authorization does not extend to regulations affecting hours of
labor, nor to the reduction of pensions, social insurance or unemployment
insurance.
Decrees issued on this basis shall be reported without delay to the
Reichstag and to the Reichsrat. On demand of the Reichstag they are to be
revoked immediately.
This law goes into effect on the day of promulgation. It shall cease to
operate at the very latest on March 31, 1924, and shall lapse even before
that time with any change in the party composition of the present
government.
Id.
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response to federal treatment of the rebellions in Bavaria, Saxony,
and Thuringia, the enabling act came to an end. 105 When a new
government was formed under Chancellor Marx, however, a new
enabling act was passed authorizing similar emergency powers.106
As Professor Watkins notes, many of the emergency decrees
undertaken during this period were not only necessary due to the
ever-increasing splintering in the Reichstag but also effective at
combating the economic crisis gripping Germany, writing that
“[t]he events of the inflation period may well be taken . . . as a typical
illustration of the benefits to be derived from emergency
legislation.”107 The precedent set by these enabling acts, however,
and the expansion of emergency powers in the hands of the
executive Cabinet laid the groundwork for the opponents of the
Weimar Republic to destroy the constitutional order from within.
c. Article 48 and the Fall of the Weimar Republic
After the emergency response to the deflationary crisis of 1923
proved to be successful, the period between 1924-1929 was relatively
WATKINS, supra note 70, at 79.
Ermächtigungsgesetz [Enabling Act], Oct. 15, 1923, RGBL I at 1167, § 1
(Ger.), translated in WATKINS, supra note 70, at 80. The full text of the Marx enabling
reads:
105

106

The federal government is authorized to take those measures which
it considers to be absolutely necessary in view of the distressing
circumstances of the people and of the Reich. Fundamental rights
guaranteed in the Weimar Constitution may not be disregarded. Before
being issued, all ordinances are to be discussed in secret session with
committees chosen by the Reichstag and by the Reichsrat, each to consist
of 15 members.
Decrees issued on this basis shall be reported without delay to the
Reichstag and to the Reichsrat. They are to be revoked on demand of the
Reichstag or of the Reichsrat. In the Reichstag two readings separated by
an interval of at least three days shall be necessary for the completion of
such a demand.
The Reichstag committee mentioned in paragraph I shall also be
authorized, at the discretion of the Reichstag, to consider proposals
relative to ordinances issued under the law of October 13, 1923 [the
Stresemann enabling act].
This law goes into effect on the day of promulgation. It shall cease to
operate on February 15, 1924.
Id.
107

WATKINS, supra note 70, at 85.
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stable.108 But, as world-wide depression hit at the end of the 1920s,
the deepening dysfunction of the Weimar Reichstag led to the worst
instance of emergency power abuse in the history of a constitutional
republic.
After several unsuccessful governments in 1926 and 1927, the
election of May 1928 saw significant decreases in the number and
percentage of Reichstag seats held by center and center-right parties,
coupled with significant increases for the Socialist and Communist
Parties and the rise of splinter groups which supported narrow
interests.109 The increasingly fractured Reichstag became less and
less capable of forming a governing coalition.110 With the onset of
the worldwide depression in 1929, Germany once again found itself
in the midst of an economic crisis. As with the deflationary crisis,
emergency powers both under Article 48 and authorized by
delegation acts provided the basis for German government. As the
Reichstag continued to splinter, however, the inability to form an
effective governing coalition meant that there was no opposition to
the extent of power exercised by the executive. Emergency decrees
became the normal mode of governance as legislation continued to
decrease and the Reichstag sat for fewer days each year between
1930 and 1932.111
Then, in the Reichstag election on July 31, 1932, the Nazi and
Communist Parties gained enough seats (230 and 89, respectively,
out of a total of 608) to block any other parties from forming a
governing coalition. 112 This Reichstag was dissolved after a vote of
no confidence in the Papen government and a new election was held
on November 6, 1932. But, once again, no governing coalition could
be formed. 113 This effectively put an end to the ability of the
legislature to function under the Weimar Constitution. Without a
functioning legislature, the only working office in the government
was that of the Presidency, held by former general Paul von
Hindenburg, who favored a return to a more imperial style of

KOLB, supra note 73, at 68.
See Id. at 78-79.
110 See id. at 78-80.
111
See, e.g., id. at 121 (“The Reichstag sat on 94 days in 1930 (including 67 after
the resignation of the ‘great coalition’), 42 in 1931 and only 13 in 1932. Ninety-eight
laws were passed in 1930; 34 in 1931, only 5 in 1932. On the other hand, the number
of emergency decrees rose from 5 in 1930 to 44 in 1931 and 66 in 1932.”).
112 Id. at 128.
113 Id. at 129.
108
109
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government. 114 With the dissolution of each successively elected
Reichstag before a vote of no-confidence could be called, each new
Chancellor after 1930 required the support of President
Hindenburg. 115 Each Cabinet then governed exclusively through
emergency decrees authorized by Article 48. In an attempt to create
a governing right-wing coalition, which would need support from
the Nazi Party to achieve a governing majority, President
Hindenburg and his advisers turned to Adolf Hitler and supported
his bid for chancellor.116 Once installed as a presidentially approved
Chancellor, Hitler relied on the precedent set by the Stresemann and
Marx Cabinets during the deflationary crisis and augmented his
Article 48 authority through the completely legal means of a new
enabling act. 117 Though the means employed did not violate the
Weimar Constitution itself, the content of the act clearly brought an
end to the Weimar Republic:
National laws may be enacted by the national cabinet as
well as in accordance with the procedure established in the
Constitution. This applies to the laws referred to in Article
85, paragraph 2 and in Article 87. [These articles provide for
parliamentary control of the budget.]
The national laws enacted by the national cabinet may
deviate from the Constitution in so far as they do not affect
the position of the Reichstag and of the Reichsrat. The
powers of the president remain unchanged.
The national laws enacted by the national cabinet are to
be prepared by the chancellor and published in the
Reichsgesetzblatt. They come into effect, unless otherwise
stipulated, upon the day following publication. Articles 68
to 77 of the Constitution do not apply to laws enacted by the
national cabinet. [These articles were the ones governing
procedure in the enactment of national legislation.]
Treaties of the Reich with foreign states which concern
matters of national legislation do not require the consent of
the bodies participating in legislation. The national cabinet

114
115
116
117

See WATKINS, supra note 70, at 96-97.
See id. at 99-101.
Id. at 109-10.
Id. at 118, 123.
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is empowered to issue all provisions necessary for the
execution of such treaties.
This law becomes effective on the day of publication. It
becomes invalid on April 1, 1937; it also becomes invalid
when the present national cabinet is replaced by another.118
As Professor Watkins notes, the lack of restrictions placed upon
the Article 48 powers, allowed the constitution itself to be used to
bring about the downfall of the Weimar Republic. He writes:
From a purely external standpoint, however, there was
never any need to depart from the norms of absolute legality.
Since the courts refused at all times to pass on the need for
emergency measures, the ultimate right of decision
remained for the time being in the hands of the executive.
Executive power in turn was vested in a National Socialist
chancellor. Under these circumstances there was nothing to
prevent Article 48 from becoming an effective legal agency
for the destruction of the Republic.119
This exploitation of an explicit system of emergency powers to
destroy the very foundations of constitutional government remains
the strongest historical cautionary tale against the employment of
explicit emergency powers. The subsequent examples of de Gaulle
in France and Indira Gandhi in India, to which this Article next
turns, provide less extreme historical incidents which are worthy of
investigation to see if they offer us any common threads from which
we can begin to draw a few modest conclusions.
IV. EMERGENCY POWERS IN FRANCE’S FIFTH REPUBLIC
Article 16 of the 1958 French Constitution grants the President of
the Republic the ability to invoke a state of emergency upon
consultation with specified members of Parliament and the
Constitutional Council.120 Such an invocation grants the President
Id. at 123 (translating Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBL], Nov. 19, 1923, pt. 1 (Ger.)).
Id. at 118.
120
1958 CONST. art. 16 (Fr.) (“When the institutions of the Republic, the
independence of the nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfilment of its
international commitments are threatened in a grave and immediate manner and
when the regular functioning of the constitutional governmental authorities is
118
119
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broad powers to address whatever “crisis” is at hand, including
power to unilaterally promulgate laws. 121 The story of both
executive and emergency powers under the Fifth Republic is largely
the story of Charles de Gaulle. 122 Until the 2016 Paris terrorist
attacks, Charles de Gaulle was the only French President to have
invoked an Article 16 Emergency, and his 1962 referendum
drastically strengthened the position of the president. Therefore,
this Part will sketch out the actions of the Gaullist government from
the formation of the Constitution through the 1961 Emergency and
up to the 1962 referendum which established direct election of the
President. These events had an outsized impact on the role of the
French executive and should provide sufficient context to analyze
how the use of emergency powers works under the 1958
Constitution.
The 1958 Constitution emerged from the inability of the Fourth
Republic to deal with a crisis in Algeria and the inclusion of
executive emergency powers likely stems from these troubled
origins. On May 13, 1958, French Army officers led by General
Jacques Massu formed a “Government of Public Safety” which
named Massu President of Algeria.123 Eleven days later, Algerian
forces invaded Corsica and plans for an invasion of the French
mainland were in place.124
The government structure under the Fourth Republic seemed
incapable of responding to the crisis. Largely, this incapacity was
due to the response to the Vichy regime and to some extent the “de
facto dictatorship” 125 of the provisional government put in place

interrupted, the President of the Republic shall take the measures commanded by
these circumstances, after official consultation with the Premier, the Presidents of
the assemblies and the Constitutional Council. He shall inform the nation of these
measures in a message. These measures must be prompted by the desire to ensure
to the constitutional governmental authorities, in the shortest possible time, the
means of fulfilling their assigned functions. The Constitutional Council shall be
consulted with regard to such measures. Parliament shall meet by right. The
National Assembly may not be dissolved during the exercise of emergency powers
by the President.”).
121
Id.
122
See DAVID S. BELL, PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN FIFTH REPUBLIC FRANCE 1, 1 (2000)
(“De Gaulle was a ‘political artist’, of such power that he gave French political life
a momentum which it was easier to adapt to than to turn.”).
123
JULIAN JACKSON, CHARLES DE GAULLE 72-73 (2003).
124 Id. at 74.
125 Id. at 42.
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after the liberation of Paris. 126 In the aftermath of World War II the
drafters of the Fourth Republic placed severe limitations on
executive power and created a system of parliamentary
supremacy.127 Due to deep divisions within French political parties,
however, a stable government never developed. During the twelve
years of the Fourth Republic, from 1946-1958, there were twenty-one
different governments.128 In this way the Fourth Republic appeared
to be repeating the cycle of powerless Parliaments which had
plagued and ultimately destroyed the Weimar Republic.129
While the government remained in a state of near paralysis in
the face of the Algerian putsch, Charles de Gaulle announced that he
would be willing to return to political life to confront the crisis.130 In
response to public outcry to bring de Gaulle back, the existing
government resigned, allowing for the appointment of de Gaulle.131
But de Gaulle conditioned his return to public life on the drafting of
a new constitution, one based on the vision he had elaborated twelve
years before, but which had been rejected by drafters of the
constitution of the Fourth Republic.132
De Gaulle initially laid out his ideas for the post-war constitution
in a now-famous speech at Bayeux on June 16, 1946. 133 He
envisioned an executive completely independent of parliamentary
control, who acted in the defense of the nation as a whole and rose
above the political in-fighting of the parliamentary system. He
urged that “over and above political contingencies, there be
established a national arbiter to assure continuity amidst shifting
political arrangements.”134 De Gaulle warned of the dangers of a
divided government without a strong central leader saying: “the
internal unity, cohesion, and discipline of the Government of France
must be sacrosanct, or else we will soon see the very management
126
See SOPHIE BOYRON, THE CONSTITUTION OF FRANCE: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS
16-17 (2013).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129
See supra Section III.c.
130
See JACKSON, supra note 123, at 73 (describing de Gaulle’s “calculated
intervention[] . . . announcing his readiness to assume the Powers of the Republic”).
131 Id. at 74-76.
132
See BOYRON, supra note 126, at 18.
133
Charles de Gaulle, President of the Provisional Government of the French
Republic, Speech at Bayeux of June 16, 1946, in MARTIN A. ROGOFF, FRENCH
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 37-39 (2011).
134 Id. at 38.
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of the country powerless and discredited.” 135 The recent and
traumatic disasters of strong executive governments prior to World
War II, however, influenced the drafters of the 1946 constitution far
more than de Gaulle’s words, and they largely disregarded de
Gaulle’s warnings. But de Gaulle’s fears appeared nearly prophetic
when the events in Algeria proved beyond the capacity of the Fourth
Republic.
Considering the circumstances bringing de Gaulle back into
national political life, it is perhaps unsurprising that the new
Constitution created in 1958 would more closely follow de Gaulle’s
earlier vision than did the 1946 constitution.136 This still did not go
far enough for de Gaulle. As his Bayeux speech clearly showed, de
Gaulle envisioned a powerful, independent president.137 On its face,
however, the constitution of the Fifth Republic, did not necessarily
create a “President-centered” system. For example, the President
was elected indirectly, instead of through direct universal
suffrage.138 Additionally, while the President appointed the Prime
Minister, the Prime Minister’s government was still responsible to
Parliament, and the constitution split the executive power between
the Prime Minister and the President, creating a dual executive.139
Article 16 of the 1958 Constitution, however, did grant the
President the ability to declare a state of emergency to respond to
periods of national crisis. It should be noted that De Gaulle’s
political style grated on multiple important constituencies. 140
Perhaps in recognition of this, de Gaulle encouraged his surrogates
to downplay the risks such a powerful provision posed. Michel
Debré, for example, who drafted most of the 1958 Constitution,
pointed to the retention of parliamentary supremacy in the new
constitution and the requirement that the parliament would have to
approve any invocation of Article 16. 141 In large part due to the

135
136

6 (2011).

Id. at 38-39.
MARTIN A. ROGOFF, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 5-

de Gaulle, supra note 133, at 37-39.
1958 CONST. art. 6 (Fr.) (prior to the 1962 Referendum).
139
BRICE DICKSON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 48-49 (1994).
140
JACKSON, supra note 123, at 111-12 (noting that under de Gaulle’s leadership
certain politicians “progressively bec[a]me alienated from him … conservatives by
his Algerian policy, Socialists by his economic policy, liberals by his antiAmericanism, and the Catholic centrists by his disparagement of European unity”).
141
Michel Debré, Speech Before the Council of State of August 27, 1958, in
ROGOFF, supra note 136, at 44.
137
138
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continued threat of an Algerian Civil War, the 1958 Constitution was
accepted with Article 16 intact and took effect on October 4, 1958.142
While the beginning of the Algerian rebellion had brought de
Gaulle back into national leadership and led to the creation of the
1958 Constitution, over the next three years the Algerian situation
continued to plague the Gaullist government and eventually led to
de Gaulle’s invocation of a state of emergency under Article 16. On
April 22, 1961, military leaders in Algeria attempted another coup.143
De Gaulle sought and received approval from the Prime Minister,
the Presidents of the legislative chambers and the Constitutional
Council to declare a state of emergency.144 He then immediately
went on national radio and appealed to the loyalty of the Army.145
The coup failed almost instantly and the danger had passed by April
25th, yet de Gaulle maintained a state of emergency for six more
months.146
During the Emergency, de Gaulle used his Article 16 authority
to pass several directives, which likely could not have made it
through a divided legislature. Additionally, while de Gaulle
followed the letter of Article 16, which explicitly prohibits
dissolution of the legislature during an Emergency, he prohibited
the sitting assembly from debating any measures related to the
Emergency. 147 By removing any potential check on his power from
the legislature, de Gaulle had essentially given himself free reign to
govern as he saw fit, because prior to the Freedom of Association Case,
the Constitutional Council rarely exercised judicial review.148 This
meant that, in reality, the Gaullist government operated with almost
complete dictatorial power between April 23 and September 29,
1961.149
While de Gaulle’s use of Article 16 caused many to fear increases
in executive power, a later action using a different portion of the
BOYRON, supra note 126, at 18.
Id. at 60.
144 Id.
145
See JACKSON, supra note 123, at 114-16 (explaining the modernization and
development de Gaulle’s speeches).
146
BOYRON, supra note 126, at 60.
147 Id. (“[D]e Gaulle interpreted the constitutional provision as prohibiting
Parliament to debate any issues or decisions relevant to the use of article 16.”).
148
See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 7144DC, July 16, 1971, Rec. 29 (Fr.), reprinted in ROGOFF, supra note 136, at 191; see also
ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 94 (1992).
149
BOYRON, supra note 126, at 60.
142
143
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1958 Constitution made perhaps the greatest alteration to the
government structure of the Fifth Republic. As discussed above, de
Gaulle firmly believed that the President of the Republic should bear
responsibility for the security of the nation. But the 1958
Constitution had granted the Parliamentary government a nominal
supremacy. 150 In spite of this, de Gaulle believed that a
democratically “legitimate” President could gain the upper hand.
However, as discussed above, Article 6 established an indirect
election for the President.151 To change this election procedure, de
Gaulle would need to change the constitution.
Article 89 specified the procedure for amending the constitution
and under the requirements of the amendment process, in order to
implement direct national election of the president, de Gaulle would
need parliamentary approval. 152 Leftists in the legislature still
feared a Gaullist dictatorship and could prevent the passage of the
desired amendment. 153 Instead of following this prescribed
amendment process, de Gaulle appealed directly to the French
electorate and called for a national referendum on direct Presidential
election.154
Article 11 of the 1958 Constitution allowed for direct referenda
to change the “organization of the public authorities,” 155 and de
Gaulle claimed that changing the electoral structure to allow direct
universal suffrage for the President fell into this Article 11
category. 156 Legal scholars and commentators almost universally
condemned de Gaulle’s referendum as it would alter the
constitutionally prescribed method for selecting the president and
therefore could only be accomplished through an Article 89
constitutional amendment. 157 Despite these legal objections, de
Gaulle’s referendum was approved by sixty-two percent of voters.158
The transition to direct national election of the president has had
a much longer lasting effect on constitutional allocation of powers
than the 1961 Emergency period. While this perhaps shows that
emergency powers are less effective at accumulating executive
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Debré, supra note 141, at 44-45.
1958 CONST. art. 6 (Fr.).
Id. art. 89.
BOYRON, supra note 126, at 61.
Id.
1958 CONST. art. 11 (Fr.).
BOYRON, supra note 126, at 61.
See JACKSON, supra note 123, at 112.
Id.
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power over the long term, the severe impact on civil liberties
demonstrated during the six-month de Gaulle Emergency shows
that emergency powers lend themselves to executive abuse. This
theme will emerge even more clearly in the following analysis of
emergency powers in India.
V. EMERGENCY POWERS IN INDIRA GANDHI’S INDIA
As with de Gaulle in France, the Indian story of emergency
power largely revolves around a single individual: Indira Gandhi.
Gandhi’s use of emergency powers to quell political opposition and
maintain her hold on national leadership traumatized the country
and led to significant reforms in the Indian concept of emergency
powers. This Part will focus primarily on the events leading up to
and during the so-called “Internal Emergency” of 1975-1977.
Under the initially adopted Indian Constitution, the president of
India could declare a state of Emergency under Article 352 in cases
where “the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists
whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof
is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal
A declaration of Emergency suspended
disturbance.” 159
prohibitions on federal actions within the states;160 imposed a duty
on the federal government to protect the states from “external
aggression and internal disturbance”;161 suspended the protections
for fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Article 19 of the
Constitution;162 and allowed the President to close the courts to any
challenges against emergency actions brought under any of the
fundamental rights guarantees in Part III of the constitution.163 This
Part describes how, as a direct result of the Internal Emergency, the
constitution was amended to more clearly define the situations
159
India Const. art. 352. As discussed below after the Internal Emergency, this
Article was amended so that the phrase “internal disturbance” was replaced with
“armed rebellion.”
160
India Const. art. 353.
161
India Const. art. 355.
162
India Const. art. 358.
163
See India Const. art. 359 (“[When] a Proclamation of Emergency is in
operation, the President may by order declare that the right to move any court for
the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part III as may be mentioned in
the order and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the rights
so mentioned shall remain suspended for the period during which the
Proclamation is in force . . . .”).
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which would justify a declared Emergency and to expand the role
of the courts in checking emergency actions.164
a. Drafting History
While the emergency powers described above are quite
sweeping and remained relatively unchanged for the first thirty
years of constitutional government in India, not all members of the
Constituent Assembly favored including such dramatic allocations
of authority to the government in times of crises. In fact, during the
drafting convention, several assembly members voiced extensive
opposition citing the dangers posed by explicit approval of
emergency powers. For example, one member of the Constituent
Assembly, H. V. Kamath, objected to the proposed emergency
provisions in the draft constitution based on the role the abuse of
such powers played in the fall of the Weimar Republic:
I find no parallel to this Chapter of Emergency Provisions in
any of the other Constitutions of democratic countries in the
world. The closest approximation to my mind is reached in
the Weimar Constitution of the Third Reich which was
destroyed by Hitler, taking advantage of the very same
provisions contained in that Constitution . . . .
It has been recognized by students of politics that the very
provisions in the Weimar Constitution . . . contributed to the
rise of Herr Hitler and paved the way to his dictatorship.
Compared to that art 48 of the Weimar Constitution, the
provisions we are making under Chapter XI are far more
drastic . . . [sic] We should alter and revise this Chapter to see
that the liberties guaranteed in this Constitution are real.165
Another member, Professor K. T. Shah, objected to the limitations
emergency powers would place on the proposed Supreme Court:
The moment you introduce a provision like this in our
Constitution, the moment you provide that the right to move
the Supreme Court which has been guaranteed by a previous
164
India Const. Part III, amended by The Constitution (Forty-Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1978.
165
Anil B Divan, Emergency Powers and the Indian Constitution, in DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF NANI PALKHIVALA 49,
52-53 (Venkat Iyer, ed., 2000).
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article shall be suspended by an Order of the President, by
an Order of the Executive, that moment you declare that
your entire Constitution is of no effect.166
These objections succeeded in defeating the initial push for an
emergency powers provision. The issue reappeared later in the
drafting process, however, and was included in the final
constitution apparently without any further difficulty.167
b. Early Uses of Emergency Powers
Prior to Indira Gandhi’s Emergency of 1975-1977, Article 352 had
only been invoked in the face of external military conflicts. In the
Fall of 1962 in response to an “armed conflict with China,” the
Indian government declared its first Emergency under the new
Constitution.168 The government used its emergency authority to
issue the “Defence of India Ordinance” and the “Defence of India
These acts—coupled with a Presidential Order
Rules.” 169
suspending the ability to mount certain challenges to
unconstitutional detentions—allowed the government to detain
individuals without any judicial process.170
Despite the jurisdictional bar imposed by the Presidential Order,
the Indian Supreme Court entertained a challenge by detainees
arrested under the Defence of India Act. 171 In Makhan Singh, the
Court ruled that while Article 359 allowed the President to prohibit
challenges to emergency actions if those challenges were based on
specified constitutional guarantees located within Part III of the
constitution, such a bar did not prohibit detention challenges
brought on other grounds. 172 Mr. Singh then filed a subsequent
petition alleging bad faith prosecution (mala fides) and was granted
release by the Supreme Court.173

Id. at 54.
Id. (“[The emergency powers provision] surfaced again later on and was
passed without any substantial amendments that would have met the criticism.”).
168 Id. at 58.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171
Makhan Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 381 (India).
172
Id.
173
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 1120 (India).
166
167
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As with the French Emergency in 1961, the danger of armed
hostilities passed quickly, but the State of Emergency continued
long after the threat. The Makhan Singh cases were heard in 1963,
but the Emergency continued and was still in place in August of
1965 when armed hostilities erupted between India and Pakistan.174
The government simply adapted the existing emergency to the new
conflict and although once again the actual skirmishes receded
within a few weeks, the Emergency remained in place until January
1968, when sufficient public pressure had mounted to convince the
government to end the Emergency.175
The second Emergency declared under the 1948 Constitution
arose from another armed conflict with Pakistan. In December 1971,
a civil war between West Pakistan and the eastern portion of
Pakistan, which would become Bangladesh, spilled over the border
into India when Pakistani planes bombarded Indian air bases. 176
Indira Gandhi (who had been elected Prime Minister in 1967), 177
engaged the Pakistani military immediately and declared an
Emergency to deal with the crisis.178 Acting under this emergency
authority the government passed the “Maintenance of Internal
Security Act 1971” (MISA), which once again allowed the
government a relatively free-hand in detaining would-be
dissenters. 179 The government used its authority under MISA
extensively and detained “tens of thousands of persons, including
communist leaders, students, peasants and industrial workers.”180
Once again, the military engagement ended quickly, as one of
Gandhi’s many biographers put it: “The well-oiled Indian war
machine performed brilliantly . . . and the lightning campaign to
free Bangladesh was over in exactly fourteen days.”181 In what had
become a familiar pattern, however, the government continued to
operate under a State of Emergency for years, even reaffirming the
Divan, supra note 165, at 59-60.
Id. at 60.
176
INDER MALHOTRA, INDIRA GANDHI: A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY
138 (1989).
177
See Aubrey Menen, Indira Gandhi is Sort of the de Gaulle of India, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 1972, at SM8 (describing Gandhi’s rise to power including her political fight
with the “old guard” of the Congress Party which she won decisively in the election
of 1972). While thoroughly interesting history, that story is beyond the scope of this
essay.
178
Divan, supra note 165, at 60.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181
MALHOTRA, supra note 176, at 139.
174
175
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Emergency by Presidential Order in November of 1974, despite the
cessation of hostilities nearly three years earlier and the completion
of a peace treaty between Pakistan and India (with recognition of the
new government of Bangladesh) in July of 1972.182
c. The Internal Emergency
In the spring of 1974, student protests erupted in the state of
Bihar. 183 A retired socialist leader named Jayaprakash (J. P.)
Narayan returned to political life and organized the unrest in Bihar
into a growing opposition movement. 184 The government, still
under the control of Prime minister Gandhi, used its authority under
the continued Pakistan Emergency to harshly crack down on this
movement but protests continued to gain momentum.185 Various
political parties in state “by-elections” began nominating joint
candidates who shared only the trait of opposing Gandhi’s Congress
Party (CPP).186 In election after election throughout the last half of
1974 and the first half of 1975, the CPP suffered electoral declines,
pointing towards a strong likelihood that the CPP would lose the
upcoming national elections.187
In addition to mounting political opposition, the Prime Minister
faced rebuke in the courts as well. On June 24, 1975, the High Court
of Allahabad issued a judgment against Gandhi in an election
corruption case which had been filed after her victory in the 1972
elections.188 The judgment prohibited Gandhi from participating as
a member of Parliament for six years, essentially preventing her
from governing as Prime Minister.189 The court stayed the order for
twenty days in order to allow for an orderly transition of power but
refused a permanent injunction while the government appealed the
case to the Supreme Court.190

182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190

Divan, supra note 165, at 60-61.
NAYANTARA SAHGAL, INDIRA GANDHI: HER ROAD TO POWER 113 (1982).
Id. at 113-20.
Id. at 119-20.
Id. at 127.
Id.
Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) 2 SCC 159 (India).
Id. ¶ 28.
Id. ¶ 27.
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Rather than step down, however, Gandhi declared a new
Emergency, this time based on “internal disturbances” as allowed
under the original wording of Article 352. 191 While previous
emergencies had lingered long after armed hostilities with external
threats had ceased (and, in fact, the Pakistan Emergency was
technically still in effect), this was the first time an Emergency had
been declared based solely on alleged internal threats.192 Gandhi’s
government immediately began arresting opposition leaders,
including J. P. Narayan193 and other prominent political figures.194
Professor Divan characterizes the detentions as targeted against
“anyone deemed ‘unfriendly’ to Gandhi and the ruling Congress
party.”195 Additionally, the government halted the publication of
“opposition” newspapers and imposed stringent new censorship
requirements on the remaining media outlets, including making it a
crime to criticize the government.196
As it had done during the Chinese Emergency, the judiciary took
some steps to check exercises of emergency powers, particularly in
response to emergency detentions. This response reached all the
way to the State High Courts, who continued to hear and grant
habeas relief in the initial stages of the Emergency. Once the
government appealed these cases to the Supreme Court, however,
the judiciary no longer posed a barrier to most of the government’s
emergency actions. 197
After the Supreme Court ruled against the government’s initial
attempts at economic nationalization, Gandhi set out to “tame” the
judiciary.198 When Chief Justice Sikri retired the day after handing
down this decision, Gandhi appointed A. N. Ray to replace him.199
Prior to this, the customary practice was to appoint the next most
senior justice to the Chief Justice position. J. M. Shelat, the next in
line for the job, had ruled against the government in the Kesavananda

See SAHGAL, supra note 183, at 149-50.
See id.
193
See id. at 153.
194
See id. at 149-50.
195
DIVAN, supra note 165, at 62-63.
196
SAHGAL, supra note 183, at 151-57.
197
DIVAN, supra note 165, at 64.
198
MALHOTRA, supra note 176, at 152. The case, Kesavananda Bharati v. State
of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 (India), has become one of the most famous cases in
Indian constitutional law.
199 Id. at 152-53.
191
192
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Bharati case, as had the next two most senior justices. 200 Gandhi
bypassed all three of these justices and named Ray as the new Chief
Justice.201 Although only the fourth most senior justice on the court,
he was the most senior justice who had ruled in her favor in
Kesavananda Bharati.202 The passed-over justices promptly resigned
in protest, essentially allowing Gandhi to “pack” the Court with
friendly justices. 203 It was this government-friendly Court which
passed on the legality of the Internal Emergency detentions, as well
as other emergency power actions taken by the government, and
which upheld most of those government actions.
With the president firmly under the thumb of the parliamentary
government and with the judiciary removed as an obstacle, Gandhi
continued to use the Internal Emergency to her advantage and
pushed through several constitutional amendments designed to
solidify her power grab. These amendments further restricted the
ability of the courts by: taking away jurisdiction to hear election
disputes; raising over one hundred statutes to constitutionally
protected status including MISA; restricting the ability of state High
Courts to issue certain writs under Article 226 of the constitution
(including writs of habeas corpus); implementing a requirement of a
two-thirds majority of Supreme Court justices in order to declare a
law unconstitutional; and restricting judicial review of laws aimed
at “anti-national activities.”204 These amendments themselves were
also declared to be unreviewable by the courts.205
In spite of her near total control of the Indian government,
Gandhi believed she needed to reintroduce an element of
democratic legitimacy in order to secure her position.206 Confident
in the belief that her crackdown on the press and the opposition
leaders had effectively destroyed her political adversaries, she called
a snap election in the Spring of 1977. 207 Gandhi had vastly
underestimated the popular anger engendered by the Internal

Id. at 152.
Id. at 153.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204
DIVAN, supra note 165, at 65-66 (describing the Amendments passed during
the Emergency).
205 Id. at 66.
206 Id. at 67-68.
207 Id. at 68.
200
201
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Emergency and, to her apparent surprise, she and the Congress
Party suffered a crushing electoral defeat.208
The newly elected government immediately went to work
reversing the constitutional amendments passed during the
Emergency. In less than a year it had passed the Constitution (44th
Amendment) Act 1978, which altered the procedures for declaring
emergencies and restricted the powers granted during an
emergency. 209 For example, the ability to declare an Article 352
emergency for an “internal disturbance” was replaced with a more
limited ability in response to an “armed rebellion.” Additionally,
the Amendment required that an emergency declaration be
approved by a majority in Parliament and two-thirds of the voting
members present in order to remain effective. To extend an
emergency, it would need to be reaffirmed by Parliament every six
months. And, in response to the attacks on the judiciary, the
Amendment prohibited stripping jurisdiction from the Courts to
hear challenges to detentions of more than two months or challenges
to emergency action which were claimed to violate Articles 21 and
22 of the constitution, which protect the “fundamental rights” to life,
liberty, and protection against arbitrary arrest, respectively.210
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Internal
Emergency of 1975-1977 came close to destroying constitutional
democracy in India. The constitutional reforms which resulted from
the experience, however, have greatly restrained the temptation to
invoke formal states of emergency. Subsequent emergencies have
been called only in response to direct military threat, such as armed
hostilities in Kashmir.211
VI. EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
Unlike the Weimar, French, and Indian constitutions, the U.S.
Constitution has no explicit “emergency powers” clause. Instead, it
contains a Vesting Clause which grants the President the noticeably

Id.
Id. at 68-69 (describing the effects of the 44th Amendment).
210
Id.; India Const. arts. 21-22.
211 See John F. Burns, India Extends Emergency Powers in Kashmir, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 9, 1994, at A9.
208
209
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undefined “executive power,” 212 along with the authority of the
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States.” 213 Additionally, the U.S. Constitution anticipates the
potential for military conflicts and allows Congress the authority to
call up the state militias to “suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions.”214 One further important distinction between the U.S.
Constitution and those discussed above is that, instead of allowing
for the suspension of fundamental rights during a declared state of
emergency, the Constitution allows only the writ of habeas corpus
to be suspended and seems (at least arguably based on the
placement of the Suspension Clause in Article I) to confine such
suspensions to the legislature in a few narrowly delineated
circumstances.215
As the drafting history of Article II and the executive powers has
been thoroughly described elsewhere, this Part will refrain from that
well-trodden (though endlessly fascinating) ground and will instead
provide a short glimpse at executive responses to three of our
nation’s most dire national crises. Abraham Lincoln, Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, and George W. Bush each faced national threats
which could potentially have destroyed the country. All three
reacted by making expansive uses of executive power, basing their
authority to take such actions in the vague wording of Article II.
While examinations of the constitutionality of these actions has
filled volumes of scholarly works, this Part will avoid such questions
(though they will surface to some extent in Part VII) and instead will
use the experiences of these three Presidents to show that, even
absent an emergency powers clause, a constitution which provides
for a sufficiently strong executive can survive times of national
crisis.
This brief historical account is not meant to imply that these were
the only U.S. Presidents to make use of expansive executive powers
during national emergencies. The actions of George Washington in
the face of the Whiskey Rebellion,216 Thomas Jefferson’s decision to
212
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.”).
213
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
214
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
215
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.”) (emphasis added).
216
JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND: THE HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER FROM
GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH 68-71 (2009).
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unilaterally authorize the Louisiana Purchase,217 Andrew Jackson’s
battle with the National Bank, 218 Woodrow Wilson’s efforts to
promote extensive censorship during World War I,219 and many of
the measures used during the Cold War and by modern presidents
provide numerous opportunities to examine emergency executive
action. The time and space constraints of this Article, however,
make it prudent to focus on the extreme examples of Lincoln during
the Civil War, FDR during the Great Depression, and George W.
Bush in prosecuting the War on Terror. The real threat to the
continued viability of the country faced by these presidents
demonstrates most clearly that the United States’ model has allowed
the executive to respond to national emergencies despite lacking an
emergency powers provision. Whether this implied structure
presents a greater threat to individual liberties than the explicit
structures discussed above will be examined in Part VII.
a. Abraham Lincoln
Perhaps the most well-known use of United States executive
powers to combat a national emergency were the actions taken by
Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War.
Historians almost
universally credit Lincoln with saving the Union, and such claims
merit consideration in large part because of the extraordinary
measures Lincoln took throughout the War, measures which
seemed to disregard practice and precedent as well as traditional
understanding of the limits on executive powers. Just over a month
after his inauguration, Lincoln authorized the military to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus; 220 he authorized military detention of
civilians;221 he openly defied an order from a U.S. Supreme Court
Justice; 222 and he unilaterally ended slavery in the states still “in
Id. at 117-23.
Id. at 165-76.
219
ROSSITER, supra note 29, at 241-50.
220
Order, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, to Winfield Scott,
The Commanding Gen. of the Army of the United States, in WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,
ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 25 (1998) (authorizing the
Commanding General of the Army of the United States to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus “[i]f at any point . . . you find resistance which renders it necessary”).
221 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
25-26 (1998)
222 Id. at 38.
217
218
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rebellion” against the Union. 223 While Congress subsequently
provided retroactive approval for many of these actions, Lincoln
initially undertook such measures on his own under the umbrella of
his executive power as commander-in-chief. Yet despite this
extensive use of executive power, the mechanisms of our
constitutional republic continued to function to some extent. For
example, elections were never suspended even as Lincoln faced
potential defeat in the election of 1864. This is a common theme in
the use of emergency powers under the U.S. Constitution. Not once
have presidential elections been suspended even in the face of a
national emergency.
This Article will not attempt a detailed analysis of the litany of
Lincoln’s war-time maneuvers; however, a brief survey will help
provide context for the way in which the U.S. constitutional model
allows for extraordinary responses to extraordinary situations in the
absence of an explicit emergency provision.
i.

Habeas Corpus

On April 27, 1861, Lincoln authorized General Winfield Scott to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and detain individuals suspected
of “resisting” the Union government near vital Maryland rail lines
necessary to supply the Capitol with troops and supplies.224 One
such detainee challenged his detention in the famous case of Ex parte
Merryman.225 Chief Justice Taney, riding circuit, heard Merryman’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered General George
Cadwalader (who was in charge of the garrison where Merryman
was being held) to produce Merryman before the court. 226 The
General refused to produce Merryman, and Taney issued an opinion
from the bench declaring that the President did not have the
authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and that the military
could not arrest civilians.227 Taney recognized that little could be
done to enforce his order as any attempt by civil law enforcement to
bring the disobedient general into court would be met with the
223
Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, Emancipation
Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863).
224
REHNQUIST, supra note 221, at 25.
225
17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
226 Id. at 148.
227 Id. at 152.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2021

386

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:2

armed resistance of the U.S. military.228 Nevertheless, Taney sent his
opinion to President Lincoln, who promptly ignored the ruling and
defended his suspension of the writ in a message to Congress given
July 4th of that year.229
Scholars have long debated whether Lincoln had the
constitutional authority to suspend the writ without Congressional
approval. This question will be discussed in more detail in Part VII.
For now, it is sufficient to note that even in the absence of an express
emergency powers provision, and regardless of the legality or
illegality of Lincoln’s action, the writ remained suspended despite
resistance from the Court. Congress eventually retroactively
sanctioned Lincoln’s actions by “officially” suspending the writ for
the duration of the war.
ii.

The Emancipation Proclamation

Lincoln continued to take strong executive action throughout the
course of the Civil War and always justified such actions in the
context of the crisis threatening to rip the nation apart. A second
dramatic instance demonstrating this approach was the issuance of
the Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln issued the preliminary
Emancipation Proclamation in September of 1862 after the costly
Union victory at the Battle of Antietam.230 The Proclamation went
into effect on January 1, 1863 and declared free all slaves held in
bondage in any of the states then still “in rebellion” against the
Union.231 Congress played no part in the Proclamation, and Lincoln
rooted his authority to issue it in his powers as commander-inchief.232 Critics of the Proclamation declared it a federal taking of
personal property in violation of the due process clause.
As jarring as it is to discuss the emergence from bondage of
millions of enslaved souls as a “taking of property,” the prevailing
understanding at the time supported the critics’ claims. Even
Lincoln, the “Great Emancipator,” treated the Proclamation as a
REHNQUIST, supra note 221, at 34.
Id. at 38.
230
YOO, supra note 216, at 219.
231
See generally Lincoln, supra note 223 (“[A]ll persons held as slaves within
any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion
against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free . . . .”).
232
YOO, supra note 216, at 201.
228
229
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deprivation of property.233 But because the laws of war allowed for
confiscation of enemy property, he felt justified in issuing the
Proclamation under his executive powers. Scholars can (and do)
debate whether the laws of war actually applied. Lincoln’s refusal
to acknowledge the Confederacy as a sovereign nation and his
constant references to the “Rebellion,” instead of a state of Civil War,
are offered as evidence that no official state of war existed. 234
Whether Lincoln should have justified the Proclamation as a
“necessary” measure for suppressing an internal rebellion, however,
is irrelevant to the central inquiry of this Article, because in either
situation Lincoln would have been exercising implied emergency
powers. What is relevant for our purposes is the vast expansion of
executive authority claimed with the stroke of Lincoln’s pen.
Congress had struggled with the issue of slavery for decades prior
to the Civil War, with little to show for it. Lincoln’s Proclamation
had put a virtual end to legal slavery (though it did not technically
apply to the Border States) by sheer force of executive will. Once
again, Lincoln’s actions were subsequently given tacit approval with
the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment.235
b. Franklin Delano Roosevelt
The presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt presents an
interesting look at emergency powers under the U.S. Constitution
because of the unique series of crises which occurred during his
administration. Not only was FDR the first U.S. President to make
extensive use of implied emergency powers to confront a domestic
emergency outside the more traditional context of war, rebellion, or
invasion, but he also faced the extreme military crises presented by
the lead-up to and actual outbreak of World War II. During this
period, FDR used his Commander-in-Chief powers to a greater
extent than any previous President with the possible exception of
Lincoln.
Id. at 220.
See Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1869-72.
235
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
233
234
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The New Deal and Domestic Use of Emergency Power

Perhaps the greatest expansion of executive power in U.S.
history occurred, not during a time of war or “rebellion,” but rather
amid the worst financial crisis the country (and the world) had ever
seen. FDR’s New Deal programs arguably had little effect on
stemming the tide of the Depression, and many scholars contend
that it was only the munitions manufacturing boom caused by
World War II which reengaged the U.S. economy. Regardless of
their efficacy, however, the New Deal represented an indefatigable
attempt to reverse the country’s financial collapse and along the way
grew the powers of the executive branch beyond anything even
Alexander Hamilton would have dared imagine. Additionally, FDR
clearly viewed his actions during the New Deal as an exercise of
emergency authority, stating in one national address that:
[I]n the event that the Congress shall fail [to do something to
fix the crisis] . . . and in the event that the national emergency
is still critical, I shall not evade the clear course of duty that
will then confront me. I shall ask the Congress for the one
remaining instrument to meet the crisis—broad Executive
power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the
power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded
by a foreign foe.236
Telling in this statement, however, is FDR’s admission that such a
use of executive power during a domestic crisis needed
Congressional approval.
Rossiter, writing shortly after the end of World War II
recognized “five . . . crisis techniques” to combat the Great
Depression:
“executive initiative, executive leadership of
legislation, an abbreviated legislative process, the delegation of
powers by stature, and an expansion of the administrative
branch.” 237 Because of this variety of tools employed during the
emergency, the New Deal presents an exceptional model to examine
the way in which all three branches of government must cooperate
over the long run in order to allow for an extension of executive
236
S. SPECIAL COMM. ON NAT’L EMERGENCIES AND DELEGATED EMERGENCY
POWERS, 93D CONG., A BRIEF HISTORY OF EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES:
A WORKING PAPER 56 (Comm. Print 1974) (quoting 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (1938)).
237
ROSSITER, supra note 29, at 256.
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power. Rather than rehash the well-trod ground of President
Roosevelt’s daunting list of executive actions during the New Deal,
this Part will provide a brief look at the responses made by the other
branches of government to emergency action. As would be expected
in the face of such a dire emergency, Congress (the branch most
closely tied to the voters) fell right in line with FDR’s plan and the
majority worked together with the Administration to pass a
breathtaking number of monumental legislative programs in FDR’s
first one hundred days.238 During this time FDR “became a prime
minister” and was responsible to an unprecedented degree for
setting the domestic legislative agenda.239 Because of the rapidity
with which FDR rolled out his efforts to combat the ever-deepening
depression, Congress had little time to re-assert control over the
legislative process. 240 But, even given more time, the pattern of
legislative acquiescence in the face of a present emergency would
likely have repeated itself.
The Supreme Court, however, initially proved an
insurmountable obstacle to many of the First New Deal programs.
When challenges to these new agencies reached the Court in 19361937, it struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act, 241 the
Agricultural Adjustment Act,242 and the actions of the newly formed
SEC,243 to name a few examples. This judicial resistance is in line
YOO, supra note 216, at 263.
ROSSITER, supra note 29, at 259 (“To a degree never before matched in
American history, the President became a prime minister. He proposed to Congress
a complete and detailed program of emergency legislation, and, although this
program entailed unprecedented grants of legislative and administrative power, he
was able to obtain its enactment substantial without change and in record time.”
(footnote omitted)).
240
Id. at 259-60 (“The Congress of the Hundred Days was practically a
wartime legislature. The forms of lawmaking were observed, but all along the line
there was a sensible abbreviation of the many steps in the legislative process. In
both House and Senate debates were shortened and kept to the point. The average
debating time in the House for each of the eleven most important bills was three
and two-thirds hours.”).
241
See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(holding the National Industrial Recovery Act an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority).
242
See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (holding the Agricultural
Adjustment Act an unconstitutional encroachment upon states’ power to regulate
agricultural production).
243
See Jones v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 298 U.S. 1, 23 (1936) (“The action of the
commission finds no support in right principle or in law. It is wholly unreasonable
and arbitrary. It violates the cardinal precept upon which the constitutional
safeguards of personal liberty ultimately rest . . . .”).
238
239
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with the previously established pattern that a significant gap in time
between executive action and a challenge to that action in another
branch of government typically weighs against the legitimacy of that
executive action. As the Depression wore on, however, the Court
began to face mounting political pressures, including of course
FDR’s infamous court packing scheme. And, eventually, the Court’s
intransigence to FDR’s expansive new programs dissolved. By the
time the Second New Deal programs, such as the National Labor
Relations Act, came up for review in 1937, the judiciary reversed
course and upheld these expansions to the administrative state.244
This is perhaps more attributable to the fact that the emergency was
still ongoing and therefore is not necessarily a break from our
previously established patterns.
ii.

Emergency Power in a World at War: Japanese Internment

In addition to the unprecedented expansion of executive power
in domestic policy, FDR’s use of emergency powers at home during
World War II resulted in one of the U.S. government’s greatest
intrusions on the civil liberties of its people: the internment of
hundreds of thousands of Japanese Americans. After the attack on
Pearl Harbor, a mild form of hysteria gripped the West Coast of the
United States leading to an ever-increasing suspicion of residents of
Japanese descent. 245 Local politicians (particularly in California)
began agitating for the “relocation” of Japanese immigrants and
even citizens of Japanese descent.246 By February of 1942, FDR had
signed off on a military plan to send over 100,000 first- and secondgeneration Japanese residents on the West Coast to relocation
centers. 247 The constitutionality of this action was challenged
repeatedly in the courts. In the first case, Hirabayashi v. United
States,248 the Court essentially punted on the constitutionality of the
detention camps themselves and held only that an accompanying

244 See Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(holding that the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 was constitutional).
245
REHNQUIST, supra note 221, at 188-89.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248
320 U.S. 81 (1943) (holding that the President’s enactment of the curfew
was constitutional).
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curfew was constitutional under the national power to “wage
war.”249
Subsequently however, in the much-maligned decision of
Korematsu v. United States, 250 the Court infamously upheld the
constitutionality of the internment camps writing: “There was
evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities
considered that the need for action was great, and time was short.
We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of
hindsight—now say that at that time these actions were
unjustified.” 251 Yet this is exactly the role that the courts had
previously played when evaluating challenges to executive actions.
It is precisely this gap in time which had allowed the courts to
exercise a check on the executive. Unlike previous incidents of
judicial restriction of emergency powers, however, Korematsu came
to the Court while the crisis of World War II was still ongoing. While
this does not excuse the Court’s failure to protect the civil liberties
of hundreds of thousands of Americans, it does situate the Korematsu
decision within a familiar pattern that demonstrates the difficulty of
requiring only post hoc review from the other branches of
government: If a crisis still exists it is much more difficult to restrain
the governmental branch that is actively attempting to resolve the
crisis.
Rather, in such situations it is easier for the other branches
(particularly the courts) to place limits at the margins of emergency
powers and then gradually continue to restrict executive power after
the crisis passes. In the case of Japanese internment, this is precisely
what happened in Ex parte Mitsuye Endo,252 decided at the same time
as Korematsu.
While the Court was unwilling to declare
unconstitutional the massive governmental action of evacuating and
detaining hundreds of thousands of Japanese-Americans, it was
willing to take the minor step of granting relief on an individual
basis to those who appealed the legality of their continued
detention.253 In doing so, the Court left in place the initial evacuation

249 Id. at 93 (“[The] war power of the national government is ‘the power to
wage war successfully.’”).
250
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that Executive Order 9066, ordering JapaneseAmericans to relocation camps, was constitutional).
251 Id. at 223-24.
252
323 U.S. 283 (1944) (holding that the detention of loyal U.S. citizens is
unconstitutional).
253 Id. at 302.
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order but planted the seed for further restrictions on governmental
power to restrict the liberty of a citizen based solely on race, writing:
A citizen who is concededly loyal presents no problem of
espionage or sabotage. Loyalty is a matter of the heart and
mind, not of race, creed, or color. He who is loyal is by
definition not a spy or a saboteur. When the power to detain
is derived from the power to protect the war effort against
espionage and sabotage, detention which has no relationship
to that objective is unauthorized.254
The combined agreement of the Executive, Legislative, and
Judicial branches on the creation of the modern administrative state
and the unprecedented level of “war powers” exercised on domestic
soil represents the greatest expansion of executive power in U.S.
history. Perhaps because FDR took these actions in the absence of a
defined “emergency power,” they have had a more lasting impact
on the separation of powers than any of the emergency actions taken
by Indira Gandhi or Charles de Gaulle? This question will be
addressed more fully in Part VII below, but first let us look at one
more example of emergency action under the implied powers
structure of the U.S. Constitution.
c. George W. Bush and the War on Terror
President George W. Bush’s actions taken in response to the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the ensuing war on terror
sparked a renewed interest in executive powers and resulted in
countless pages of scholarship debating the legality and
constitutionality of his actions. 255 This Article is not aimed at
reinvigorating that debate or focused on critiquing the strengths and
Id.
See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 405-15 (2008);
MATHESON, supra note 53, at 16-32; Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in A State
of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA. L. REV. 699, 736-48 (2006); Sanford Levinson & Jack
M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV.
1789, 1837-38 (2010); see generally Posner & Vermeule, supra note 27 (discussing the
legality of Presidents’ use of emergency powers); Scheppele, supra note 54, at 83637 (“In this Comment, I argue that the ‘normal’ American constitutional order can
be seen as thoroughly shot through with emergency law and that this constant
sense of emergency has fundamentally shaped the possibilities of American
constitutionalism.”).
254
255
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weaknesses of the various positions staked out. Rather, this Section
will simply remind the reader of some of the more public uses of
emergency power undertaken during the Bush Administration.
As memos prepared within the Bush Department of Justice
show, the administration believed that the Commander-in-Chief
powers and the Vesting Clause of the Constitution provided him
with the inherent authority to engage in many of these acts.256
While this overview will be brief, it is important to note that once
again we see a familiar pattern in response to a national crisis: The
legislature, charged with reacting quickly to the needs of the nation
and the desires of the electorate is often unable or unwilling to
provide a significant check upon emergency executive action. While
the judiciary, with the advantage of time and some protection from
political pressures, can act as a more appropriate check further
down the line.
After the destruction of the September 11th terrorist attacks,
Congress responded to President Bush’s request for greater
authority to combat terrorism by passing the Authorization for Use
of Military Force (AUMF).257 The statute authorized extensive use
of executive powers including giving the President the authority “to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.” 258 While legislators
eventually began to criticize the Bush administration’s use of this
delegated authority, they failed to take any affirmative action to
restrict the sweeping powers granted by the Authorization or other
similar statutes such as the Patriot Act.259
The Supreme Court, by contrast, had the advantage of a
separation in time between the initial crisis triggered by the attacks
and challenges to executive action. Additionally, as more time
passed between each subsequent challenge the Court took steps to
further restrict executive actions. The primary example of this
appears in the Court’s responses to the detention of “enemy
combatants” housed in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Detainees were
initially held in “GITMO” outside of both the judicial and military
256
257

(2001).

Scheppele, supra note 54, at 859.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224

Id. at § 2(a).
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001) (“To
deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to
enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes.”).
258
259
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tribunal system. 260 Appeals to this process worked their way
through the courts and eventually resulted in incremental steps
restricting executive authority over such individuals. For example,
while the Court initially declined to do more than acknowledge
jurisdiction to hear claims raised by GITMO detainees, 261 each
subsequent challenge imposed more restrictions on executive
authority. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,262 the Court required at least some
type of quasi-judicial proceedings regarding enemy combatants and
by the time Boumediene v. Bush263 was decided in 2008, the Court was
willing to declare that detainees were entitled to full judicial review
of habeas proceedings. Had the executive merely required approval
of his actions in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, there would likely
have been little resistance and executive detentions could have
continued unchecked. However, because the U.S. system does not
remove power from the other branches even when the executive
uses more of his own, the ability for subsequent review allows for
protections of civil liberties even if those protections come far too
late (as, for example, in the aftermath of Korematsu).
It seems difficult to imagine that either Congress or the Supreme
Court would have had the ability or political will to deny President
Bush the use of emergency powers in the immediate wake of 9/11.
Indeed, Congressional passage of the Authorized Use of Military
Force indicated a legislative acquiescence to the expansion of
executive power. 264 Similarly, the Court’s tepid responses to
executive detentions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba between 2001-2008
arguably show that the judiciary tacitly assented to Bush’s actions.
But as time passed and the shock of the initial attacks began to fade,
the courts became increasingly skeptical of certain executive actions,
such as executive detentions.
260
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510-11 (noting that the government
classified detainees like Hamdi as “enemy combatants” and held them
“indefinitely—without formal charges or proceedings—unless and until it ma[de]
the determination that access to counsel or further process [was] warranted”).
261
See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that federal courts had
jurisdiction to hear some challenges to detention brought by foreign nationals
incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay).
262
542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that enemy combatants must be given
meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis of their detention).
263
553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding, among other issues, that enemy combatants
have the right to challenge their detention under habeas corpus).
264
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (authorizing the use of the United States military force against those
responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks).
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This ability for the various branches of government to have
multiple opportunities to check executive emergency action is a
hallmark of an implied emergency powers system and is perhaps
the most important reason for such a system’s effectiveness in
preventing executive branch dictatorship. This claim will be
examined in the following Part.
VII. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EMERGENCY POWERS
The selected uses of emergency powers provided above
demonstrate that a country’s executive will often be required to act
in extraordinary ways when facing extraordinary circumstances.
Crises will arise in the lifespan of a nation, and governments must
react to the threat. Due to the inherent ability of the executive to
respond more quickly in these situations, pending national danger
tends to result in increased executive power. The wisdom of such a
system is beyond the scope of this Article. Rather this Part will
attempt to answer only the following question:
Does a
constitutional structure explicitly allowing for the use of emergency
powers provide better protections for individual liberty and
separation of powers than a structure lacking such explicit
allowances? While valid arguments exist on both sides of the
question, this Part will argue that the inclusion of an explicit
emergency powers provision seems to be more susceptible to abuse,
particularly by an executive faced with an impending loss of power.
a. Inter-Branch Interaction
One of the key differences between the U.S. model and an
explicit emergency power model seems to be the role left for the
remaining branches of government. For example, under the French
model the constitution requires the explicit acquiescence of the other
branches of government before an emergency can be declared. 265
This “consultation,” however, must happen at the outset of an
emergency, when fear is at its highest and the political pressures to
grant sweeping powers to the executive to combat the crisis are
typically also at their apex. Under the U.S. Constitution, by contrast,
265

1958 CONST. art. 16 (Fr.).
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executive actions taken to confront an emergency do not require
prior acquiescence from the judicial or legislative branches. Instead,
they can be subsequently reversed through legislation or held
unconstitutional by the judiciary upon review. This delay between
the onset of an emergency and when cooperation of the other
branches is required allows for a “cooling off” period which may
help counteract the immediate political pressures of the crisis.
It is possible however, that the passage of time may actually
benefit the executive if the crisis which inspired the initial
“emergency” actions continues or worsens. As we saw with the
Court’s initial response to the New Deal, the lapse of time between
action and review may relieve some of the initial “panic” impulse to
go along with dramatic executive action.266 Then, once it becomes
clear that the actions enjoy the support of the people, the cooperation
of the judicial branch can help solidify actions taken outside of the
traditional understanding of executive powers. This highlights one
of the potential dangers of emergency responses without a clearly
defined procedure delineating when the emergency has ended and
when the “role” of the executive should return to a non-emergency
state. While the danger of such systematic expansion rarely
materialized prior to World War II, the constant “emergency” of the
Cold War 267 and then the War on Terror 268 have allowed for
dramatic expansions of executive power unchecked by a postemergency return to the “normal” limits of such power.
Alternatively, the Indian framework as it existed during the
“Internal Emergency” granted the executive the authority to declare
emergencies but made the president responsible to the
parliamentary government. Thus, the legislature and the executive
worked in tandem during declared emergencies, rather than acting
as a check on each other. Additionally, emergency declarations in
India could exempt emergency actions from judicial review for
violations of civil liberties including wrongful detentions and
violations of “fundamental rights.” As discussed above, the High
See supra Section VI.b.i.
MATHESON, supra note 53, at 9-10 (“The Cold War, which lasted more than
forty years, was characterized as a constant national security threat to justify
perpetual crisis measures that contributed to the transfer of power from Congress
to the President.” (footnote omitted)).
268 Id. at 10 (“And the war on terror—an irregular and seemingly endless
conflict where the ‘world as battlefield’ is the war theater and the enemy wears no
uniform and is not formally tied to a nation-state—calls for fresh thinking about the
nature, scope, and duration of our current emergency.” (footnote omitted)).
266
267
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Courts in India attempted to find ways around these restrictions on
their jurisdiction during the Chinese, Pakistani, and the 1975-1977
Emergencies. By the time of the Internal Emergency, however, the
composition of the Supreme Court had been manipulated into a near
“rubber stamp” for the Indira Gandhi government. The Supreme
Court repeatedly refused to reach the merits of constitutional
challenges to emergency actions.
Such an all-out assault on separation of powers would be
difficult to imagine under the U.S. Constitution. While the courts
and Congress have often approved of executive actions or deferred
to executive judgment (especially in regard to foreign affairs), such
agreement does not equate to the Indian model which allows the
emergency government unchecked authority to govern as it sees fit.
Rather, such agreement can perhaps signal cross-branch agreement
on the proper course of action or might represent a knee-jerk
reaction to the immediate crisis, which can later be re-examined as
conditions change.
Once again, more recent history provides an appropriate
example. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
Congress passed the AUMF, which granted sweeping powers to the
President allowing him “to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks.” 269
As Professor Yoo points out, this grant was “unlimited as to time or
geography.” 270 The AUMF fell in a gray area between the
constitutional command that Congress had the sole authority to
declare war and the constitutional grant of Commander-in-Chief
powers to the President, essentially giving the President something
akin to emergency powers at least in the area of counterterrorist
activity. While Congress remained technically independent of the
executive, its initial deference to the executive in times of crisis
allowed the President the authority to confront the threat of Al
Qaeda. The drafting of the AUMF, however, perhaps indicates a
panicked response to a national threat as the legislation delegated
essentially unfettered authority to the executive without placing
corresponding checks on the duration or scope of that authority.

269
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat.
224 (2001).
270
YOO, supra note 216, at 411.
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b. Balance
Emergency powers may be dangerous but that does not mean a
country does not benefit from or should not design its constitution
to produce a strong executive. For example, while de Gaulle’s use
of emergency powers threatened the rise of a presidential
dictatorship, subsequent French experience showed the
contradictory danger posed by an executive too weak to govern.
The 1958 Constitution created a five-year term for legislators but a
seven-year term for the President.271 This gap made it possible for a
President of one party to have a government of a separate party
voted in during his term. While divided government is nothing new
in constitutional democracies, the manner in which executive power
was split between the president and the prime minister made it very
difficult for the government to function effectively during these
periods of so-called “cohabitation.”272
The Fifth Republic has experienced several cohabitations since
1958, during which time the government slipped into a state of nearparalysis similar to that experienced during the rotating
governments of the Fourth Republic and even somewhat analogous
to the impotence of the Reichstag towards the end of the Weimar
Republic.273 Because the president had the potential to call a state of
emergency during these periods of stagnation, he tended to have the
upper hand in pursuing his agenda, at least to some degree. This
cycle of showdowns between a president armed with the ability to
essentially suspend constitutional protections and a government
with the backing of the latest electorate, eventually led to a
constitutional amendment in 2000 which changed the term of office
of the president to five years to match legislative elections.274
The U.S. model addresses this balance through the creation of a
“unitary” executive with sufficient authority to address periods of
crisis without diminishing the powers vested in the other branches
of government. Professors Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo
have compiled an exhaustive look at a particular aspect of the
Executive Power, the Removal Power, in their 2008 work, The
Unitary Executive.275 While the authors clearly disclaim an attempt
271
272
273
274
275

BOYRON, supra note 126, at 62-63.
Id.
Id.; see also supra Part IV.
See BOYRON, supra note 126, at 67.
CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 255.
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to discuss the extent of the President’s “war powers,”276 a relevant
thread emerges which sheds light on the emergency power
discussion. The debate over the scope and breadth of the “Executive
Power” under the U.S. Constitution has consistently involved a
back-and-forth between the executive, the legislature and the
judiciary. Regardless of which branch was “winning” the argument,
the debate itself served, to some extent, to constrain the executive.
Had the Constitution included an explicit grant of emergency
powers to the President, this may have potentially altered the
permanent balance of the argument and served as an “ace in the
hole” in the debate.
This “debate” is only an informal restraint on the executive,
albeit a restraint that has proven fairly effective for nearly two-anda-half centuries. What happens when the executive no longer cares
about informal checks remains to be seen. Will the legislature and
judiciary show sufficient resolve in these cases? Additionally,
elections themselves can serve as a check on executive overreach
and an emergency powers system that does not provide for the
suspension of elections may, in fact, provide an internal structural
check. For example, as professors Steven Calabresi and James
Lindgren have noted, the U.S. President may be far less powerful
domestically than is often assumed.277 Because a President’s party
often suffers electoral defeats in both federal and state off-year
elections, it can often be difficult for the executive to significantly
shape domestic policy beyond the first two years of an
administration even within a system that provides the executive
extensive emergency authority.278 But this pattern of electoral defeat
does not have an equally restrictive effect on the Executive’s military
or foreign affairs powers which are often the most fertile ground for
emergency powers. This is especially true as Congress cedes more
and more of its involvement in military actions to the Executive. So,
while elections are a necessary check on the executive, they are not
necessarily sufficient to prevent extreme executive overreach. This
is particularly true if informal barriers such as public approval do
not deter executive action.
276 Id. at 20 (“[A]cceptance of the classic theory of the unitary executive does
not require resolution of the scholarly debate over whether the Article II Vesting
Clause grants the president a residual foreign affairs power or war power.”
(footnotes omitted)).
277
Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, The President: Lightning Rod or
King?, 115 YALE L.J. 2611, 2611-12 (2006).
278 Id. at 2612.
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c. Context and Early Leadership
Another important point to consider when comparing the
wisdom of an emergency powers provision with the U.S. model is
that constitutions are often formed with specific leaders in mind.
This can lead to failures to adequately define and control certain
functions of government. One example of this failure could be an
overreliance on informal checks on governmental powers. In
creating a government designed to appeal to “the best and the
brightest” there may be a background assumption that the
government will be led by those who reflect the Framers interest in
creating a fair and just republic. In light of such an assumption it
may also be assumed that informal checks such as precedent and
reputational constraints will be sufficient to guide and restrain a
properly civic-minded executive.
Both the U.S. Constitution and the French Constitution were
written with an identified first executive in mind. While de Gaulle
imposed his will on the constitution of the Fifth Republic and
essentially tailored it to his understanding of how the government
should function,279 Washington had a more indirect impact on the
U.S. Constitution. Much of the vagueness built into the functioning
of the Executive can largely be attributed to an understanding that
Washington would be the first President.280 The Framers (including,
of course, Washington himself) passed over many of the thornier
issues regarding executive power which could have upset the
delicate balance between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists. They
did so, confident in the knowledge that the actual role of the
executive would be shaped by the actions of its first occupant, the
trusted, steady, and honorable George Washington.281
As discussed in Part IV, concerns over a Gaullist dictatorship
impacted the drafting of the 1958 Constitution and led to at least a
nominally superior role for the Prime Minister’s government.282 Yet,
largely because of the force of de Gaulle’s personality and the
opening provided by the emergency powers, the governmental
structure was transformed. One could argue that, in some respect,
See supra Part IV.
YOO, supra note 216, at 53, 70-71.
281
Id. at 53 (“A singular factor influenced the ratification of the Constitution’s
article on the Presidency: all understood that George Washington would be elected
the first President.”).
282 See supra Part IV.
279
280
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emergency powers actually saved the Fifth Republic by allowing a
charismatic leader to create a more stable Presidential system. But
this experience also shows the dangers of granting too much power
to the executive based on the initial understanding of who will fill
that role. Essentially, in the Fifth Republic, a constitution built
around Parliamentary supremacy was unilaterally turned into a
strong presidential system in part due to the leverage provided by
an emergency powers provision.
d. Controls
In addition to comparing the experience of countries like the
United States, Germany, France, and India, another way to compare
constitutional structures with and without emergency powers is to
look at (1) what controls are needed to confine executive power in
both types of systems, (2) what efforts are needed to protect civil
liberties, and (3) whether the control necessary will inhibit the ability
of the government to respond to crisis situations. The simple
existence of a written constitution purporting to protect individual
rights and freedom cannot, on its own, limit government overreach.
If this were the case, the Russian Federation would be one of the
freest democracies in the world.283 Clearly, more is required, some
type of checks, either internally or externally, must exist to protect
individuals from government abuse.
Mark Tushnet argues that these protections for civil liberties in
the face of a national emergency most often come from “legal
controls” or “political controls.” Professor Tushnet describes these
controls as follows:
Legal controls on the exercise of emergency powers rely on
the courts to determine whether some novel practice violates
fundamental human rights; political controls rely on the
interactions among important political actors—including
political parties, the permanent staffs of executive
bureaucracies and the people in their capacity as voters—to
283
See CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION [CONSTITUTION] ch. 2 “Rights
and Freedoms of Man and Citizen” (guaranteeing, for example, that
“[f]undamental human rights and freedoms are inalienable and shall be enjoyed by
everyone since the day of birth”). My thanks to Professor Calabresi for pointing
out the extensive protections for individual freedom included in the written
Russian Constitution but overwhelmingly ignored by its government.
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produce policies that do not violate fundamental human
rights.284
Professor Tushnet argues that political controls provide the best
protections for civil liberties, even in the face of national
emergencies.285
However, when a constitution includes explicit authorization to
exercise emergency powers which allow the executive to act without
requiring the cooperation of other political actors and without the
threat of searching judicial review, the controls proposed by
Professor Tushnet will not effectively limit potential abuses of
executive powers. Legal controls are perhaps more likely to be
overcome during emergencies. In Weimar Germany, for example,
the judiciary surrendered any authority to review the
appropriateness of a declaration of a state of emergency and
deferred to the Cabinet’s decision. 286 While the Weimar Courts
could review the appropriateness of certain individual actions taken
by an emergency government, they rarely did so.287 Similarly, under
the French model, the Constitutional Council has little role to play
once an emergency has been declared and needs only to acquiesce
at the outset of an emergency. 288 Alternatively, under the Indian
model, the President can strip the courts of jurisdiction to hear
challenges to certain emergency actions. As discussed above, the
courts attempted to continue to provide some type of check on
government actions during emergency periods, but large numbers
of cases were found to be beyond review and the Supreme Court
itself was susceptible to government control.289
However, it is not clear that the judiciary provides a more
effective check on emergency actions under the U.S. model, at least
not while the emergency is ongoing. Time and again the U.S.
Supreme Court has upheld executive actions during times of
national crisis which likely would not have been upheld in calmer
times and has stepped in to restrict executive authority only once the

284
Mark Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Parliamentary
and Separation-of-Powers Regulation, 3 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 275, 276-77 (2007).
285 Id. at 277; see also Mark Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency
Powers: Some Lessons from Hamdan, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1451 (2007).
286 See supra Part III.
287 See id.
288 See supra Part IV.
289 See supra Part V.
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crisis has passed.290 U.S. Courts have proven themselves much more
likely to disapprove of executive actions when the danger has
passed and when the cases are less directly connected to military
action. But it is precisely during those times when civil liberties tend
to be most at risk.
In addition to this delayed response by the courts, the decisions
of the courts are not always sufficient to check executive power.
Take the showdown in Ex parte Merryman described above. Political
scientists and constitutional scholars have long debated whether
Lincoln had the constitutional authority to suspend habeas relief.
Those who think Lincoln exceeded his constitutional authority point
to the fact that the only discussion of the writ in the Constitution is
located among the limitations on Congressional powers in Article I
Section 9, 291 while Lincoln’s supporters point out that there is
nothing exclusive in the suspension clause. 292 Lincoln’s critics
respond that the vaunted position of the writ in English common
law history and its important place as one of the fundamental
“rights” of Englishmen suggest that it would be odd to include no
protection of the writ in the Bill of Rights, if there were any way of
suspending the writ outside of the narrow confines of the
Suspension Clause.293 Alternatively, supporters have asserted the
very persuasive argument that the Constitution cannot be
considered a “suicide pact” and clearly allows efforts to be taken
which are necessary for the survival of the nation.294
While this debate has important consequences for our
understanding of executive power in the U.S. Constitution as a
290 Compare, e.g., Korematsu v. Unites States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding
Japanese internments during World War II), and Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919) (upholding conviction of anti-government pamphleteer under the
Espionage Act despite an asserted First Amendment defense), with Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that Guantanamo Bay detainees are entitled to
habeas relief), Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (finding
unconstitutional President Truman’s seizure of American steel mills during the
Korean War), and Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (striking down use of a military
tribunal to convict a civilian when the courts of the states remained open during
the Civil War).
291 See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 221, at 36.
292
YOO, supra note 216, at 224-36.
293 Id. at 36-37.
294 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 40, at 1257 (“The Constitution itself embraces
an overriding principle of constitutional and national self-preservation that
operates as a meta-rule of construction for the document’s specific provisions and
that may even, in cases of extraordinary necessity, trump specific constitutional
requirements.”).
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whole, the relevant point for this Article is that Lincoln’s actions
defied the “legal controls” then-existing in the constitutional
structure.
Regardless of whether Lincoln’s actions were
constitutional or “extra-constitutional,” the entire experience shows
that legal controls may be altogether insufficient to check executive
action even in the U.S. model which does not explicitly provide for
the suspension or suppression of the legal process.
However, political controls seem more likely to sufficiently
check the executive in the U.S. model than in the German, French or
Indian models. In fact, the inclusion of an emergency powers
provision often explicitly allows for the silencing of opposition. In
1961, de Gaulle prohibited Parliament from debating any of his
emergency measures and took control of the national airwaves.
During the Internal Emergency, Indira Gandhi jailed thousands of
opposition leaders and completely shut down any critical news
outlets. It was not political pressure which ended these crisis
situations but rather a perceived opportunity to gain an advantage
based on temporary circumstances.
While similar efforts at censorship have occurred (and have even
received judicial sanction) in the United States, political opposition
has often been sufficient to prevent the recurrence of such invasions
of liberty.295 Additionally, political consequences seem to have a
much stronger effect on government action in the absence of an
emergency power provision which can be invoked to suppress
public opposition. The Civil Rights Marches moved Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson to action; protests against the Vietnam War
led to President Johnson’s refusal to seek a third term; and opinion
polls typically have a significant impact on national policy. What
has been fascinating to observe over the course of the Trump
administration, however, is the ways in which these political
controls have struggled to play a substantial checking function.
Whether this is the anomalous result of a Presidential
administration that seemed somehow immune from the typical
rules of American politics, or whether the events of the Trump
administration are a harbinger of a significant decline in the efficacy
of informal sanctions, remains to be seen.

295
See, e.g., ROSSITER, supra note 29, at 241-50 (describing the extensive
censorship of the press employed by Woodrow Wilson during World War I).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss2/1

2020]

Executives in Crisis
VIII.

405

CONCLUSION

While experience has shown that emergency powers provisions
lend themselves to powerful executives’ attempts to hang on to
power, in the face of democratic opposition, history has also shown
that while necessary, an “energized” executive 296 with sufficient
authority to confront national crises tends to expand its own power
incrementally during those same crises. Once the crisis turns into a
semi-permanent condition, the potential for a strong executive to
continue to accumulate power poses a real threat to a separation-ofpowers system based on checks and balances. While this risk of
aggregation of power within the executive branch seems to afflict all
constitutional systems, especially during times of crisis, inclusion of
an explicit approval of the use of “emergency powers” amplifies the
risk that the executive will stifle opposition to hold on to authority.
This is not to say that an implied emergency powers system can
alleviate this danger. Rather, it highlights the importance of
informal checks on executive action in an implied emergency
powers system. Because an implied system does not formally
distinguish between emergency action and non-emergency action,
many of the important limitations placed on executive power rely
on informal barriers such as previous practice, public opinion, and
the threat of public exposure. Throughout the course of U.S. history,
these checks have been sufficient to prevent the employment of
emergency powers to take such actions as suspending elections,
attempting to dissolve the legislature, or similar measures designed
to allow the executive to maintain a nearly unlimited hold on power.
Whether this informal system is superior to the formal barriers that
are typically included in explicit emergency powers provisions is
beyond the scope of this Article. It is important, however, to openly
acknowledge that these informal barriers are essential to an implicit
emergency powers system and to commit to defending any
challenge to these structures just as strongly as we would protect
formal constitutional requirements.

296
THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good
government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign
attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the
protection of property . . . to the security of liberty against the enterprises and
assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.”).
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